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Abstract 
We investigate whether the impact of direct support for business investment in R&D and 
innovation varies over the business cycle. We address several questions: whether firms that 
obtain public support in a recession differ from firms that obtain it during expansions; whether 
the impact of support is smaller in recessions than in expansions, and whether effects vary with 
the treatment pattern. Using firm-level data from Spain during the period 2005 to 2014, we 
combine propensity score matching and difference-in-differences methods to estimate firms’ 
response to direct support in different phases of the cycle. Two findings stand out. First, while 
the impact of support on monetary investment in innovation is pro-cyclical, it is counter-
cyclical in terms of the employee-time allocation to innovation activities. Second, the 
additionality of a one-year treatment is smaller than that of longer treatments, or repeated 
program participation. Firms receiving public support during the recession have assigned more 
employee time to innovation activities than a matched control group, preventing a decline of 
knowledge capital during the big recession.  
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1. Introduction 
The global economic and financial crisis that unleashed in 2008 had a globally negative impact 
on R&D and innovation. In the OECD member countries as a whole the growth rate of GDP 
fell by 3.5% in 2009, and business R&D investment dropped by 4.2%, while public expenditure 
-the sum of R&D expenditures by the government and higher education sectors- increased by 
4.6% that same year (OECD 2014). Over the period 1996-2012, gross expenditure in R&D has 
exhibited, at this aggregate level, a pro-cyclical behavior. The correlation between the growth 
rates of GDP and of gross domestic R&D expenditure was positive, with a correlation 
coefficient of about +0.70. This mirrors mostly the behavior of business intramural expenditure 
in R&D, since the correlation between the growth rates of GDP and of public R&D expenditure 
was negative across that same period, with a value of -0.34. This suggests a mildly counter-
cyclical behavior of public expenditure, which might have mitigated, in the aggregate, the 
potential threat to long-term growth derived from reduced business-financed R&D 
investment.1  
A closer look at the data shows that investment in R&D took different paths in different 
countries both around 2008/9 and in the aftermath of the crisis. In many OECD countries, the 
rate of growth of business-financed R&D fell in 2008 and even more in 2009.  Regarding public 
spending in R&D, a study by Pellens et al. (2018) in a panel of twenty-six OECD countries 
over the period 1995-2015,  finds that while on average public R&D behaved pro-cyclically in 
this period, in some countries it followed a counter-cyclical pattern. This disparate cross-
country evolution is worrisome, as it may have implications for long term productivity growth 
and income level convergence (Veugelers 2016, 2017; Duval et al., 2020; De Ridder 2019). 
This prospect highlights the relevance of evaluating the ability of public support to induce more 
                                                          
1
 Correlations have been computed by the authors using OECD data from the Main Science and Technology 
Indicators, published in STI Outlook 2014, Chapter 1, Fig 1.4.  
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business effort in R&D and innovation over downturns. This involves investigating the stability 
of the additionality –multiplier effect- of direct public support. Higher additionality during 
recessions than in expansions would mean that reducing public support during the former 
would be more harmful to long-run growth. Conversely, small increases of public support 
during recessions would induce more private effort than in expansions. A counter-cyclical 
additionality effect might thus contribute to stabilize knowledge related activities in the private 
sector during the cycle, and hence justify a counter-cyclical public support policy.   
Research on the effect of public support to R&D over time and across the business cycle is 
quite sparse. The studies that focus on the crisis years are Hud and Hussinger (2015), for 
German firms; Aristei et al. (2017), for a sample of firms from five EU countries, and Cruz 
Castro et al. (2017) for Spanish firms. The results of the first two studies suggest that the 
additionality of R&D support has been pro-cyclical, while the third finds some evidence of the 
opposite in that it prevented recipients from abandoning innovation activities. The main 
limitation of these studies, however, is that the data used are, basically, cross-sectional or cover 
a very short period, thus conditioning the empirical methodology and scope of the analysis.  
In this article, we contribute to expand and enrich existing empirical research by using firm-
level panel data from Spain covering the period 2005 to 2014.  Spain, one of the large members 
of the European Union, is a moderate innovator that experienced sharp public budget cuts after 
2008. Figure 1 shows the rates of growth of GDP, Business Expenditure in R&D (BERD) and 
Business-Financed BERD from 2005 to 2017. Up to 2007, BERD was increasing at a high rate, 
converging to the euro-zone ratio of BERD with respect to GDP. The crisis broke this path, 
and only about eight years later business investment in R&D has started to grow again. At the 
same time, fiscal consolidation led to a reduction in public support to business-performed 
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R&D. The percentage of BERD financed by the government reached a maximum of 17.9% in 
2008, falling thereafter to about one-half this share by 2017 (Figure 1).2  
[Insert FIGURE 1] 
How damaging is the reduction of direct support to R&D? Our firm-level panel data allow us 
to address the following specific empirical questions:  1) Does firms’ access to support vary 
over the business cycle? 2) Does the impact of support remain constant in recessions and 
expansions? 3) Does public support affect two different measures of R&D activity -private 
R&D investment and R&D employment- similarly? And finally, 4) Are results sensitive to the 
length or frequency of participation, and how long do effects last? The first question intends to 
establish whether firms that benefit from public support in recessions differ from firms that 
benefit from it during expansions, as both firms and the public agency could change their 
behavior over the cycle. The second question aims at determining whether the impact of public 
support is smaller in recessions than in expansions or otherwise. The third question intends to 
inquire beyond the standard expenditure effect of public support and look into the time 
allocation of employees to R&D activities. The last question explores some dynamic aspects 
of direct support, testing whether and how receiving support only once or more than once 
makes a difference in firms’ response both in intensity and over time.  
We employ a propensity score matching combined with difference-in-differences (conditional 
difference-in-differences, CDiD, Heckman, et al., 1998), which allows us to address selection 
on both observables and unobservables associated with the allocation of R&D funding and 
firms’ innovation decisions. We first compare firms’ participation in public R&D across the 
phases of the business cycle. We define a treatment pattern here as the number of years a firm 
reports receiving a subsidy within a given period. We then identify several treatment patterns 
                                                          
2
 The evolution of GDP over the period 2006 to 2016 in Spain was similar to the average of the nineteen-euro 
zone countries, except that the recession period lasted longer, including years 2011 to 2013. Business R&D 
spending (BERD) followed a more negative path, experiencing a sharp decline during 2008 and 2009. The 
recovery started slowly after 2013. For further information, see CDTI Annual Report, 2016 and 2017. 
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and estimate the response of participants over time compared to non-participants for two 
outcome variables: investment in innovation per employee and time allocation of employees 
to innovation activities.  
Our work expands and complements the analysis of direct support to business R&D during the 
crisis carried out by Hud and Hussinger (2015) and Aristei et al. (2017), as well as Cruz Castro 
et al. (2017). The main findings are the following. First, we do not observe significant changes 
in the allocation of public support to firms over the cycle; this precludes attributing impact 
differences to changes in the profile of recipients of subsidies. Second, the effect of public 
support depends on three factors: the stage of the cycle, the duration of support and the type of 
outcome indicator. For firms participating one year during the recession, their innovation 
investment did not increase, in contrast to expansion years. This suggests that treatment effects 
were pro-cyclical for these firms. However, for firms that participate for two years during the 
recession we find that treatment effects have been significant and higher during these years 
than pre-crisis. Finally, when looking at a different indicator, in particular firm’s allocation of 
human resources within the firm, we find that the additionality effect is higher during the 
recession. In particular, both for SMEs and large firms direct support seems to have allowed 
firms to allocate more of their employees’ time to R&D and innovation activities. This suggests 
that under some conditions –i.e., length or frequency of participation- the additionality effect 
of public support may be higher during recessions, thus magnifying the negative impact of 
budget cuts for this kind of policy.  
The layout of the article is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of research on the 
cyclical behavior of R&D investment and the impact of R&D support during the last economic 
crisis. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy. Section 5 
presents and discusses estimation results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
6 
 
2. R&D, business cycles and public support: evidence and hypotheses. 
In this section we review the main arguments and evidence about the behavior of R&D 
investment over the business cycle, as well as recent research on the specific case of the 2008 
financial crisis. We then discuss the implications for direct support policies and their ex-post 
evaluation and highlight the research gaps that we intend to address here.  
R&D investment over the business cycle. 
Investment in intangibles and R&D investment in particular, is generally affected by financing 
constraints (Hall et al. 2016). In addition, extensive firm-level empirical research provides 
strong evidence that business R&D investment is pro-cyclical on average, both at the aggregate 
and firm-level. This observed regularity would be the net outcome of two opposing 
mechanisms. On one hand, capital market imperfections and knowledge spillovers, jointly or 
separately, would drive the pro-cyclicality of business R&D investment as well as the 
introduction of product innovations. The former two factors would thus not only originate a 
well-known static market failure, but would also induce a dynamic misallocation of R&D 
investment over the cycle, with negative long-run consequences for productivity and growth. 
On the other hand, a competing and opposite hypothesis –known as the Schumpeterian view 
of recessions- is that the opportunity cost of productivity-enhancing investments (R&D), 
relative to standard physical capital investment, falls during recessions, thus providing an 
incentive to increase these activities, which would then exhibit a countercyclical behavior. 
Each of these hypotheses may lead to different policy implications. The first would suggest 
that increasing public support in recessions would be beneficial for growth; if instead the 
second hypothesis prevailed, there would be no need for a countercyclical R&D support policy.  
Contributions by Barlevy 2007; Aghion et al. 2010 and 2012 and Fabrizio and Tsolmon 2014 
illuminate this issue. Barlevy (2007) develops a theoretical model where knowledge spillovers, 
and the ensuing lack of appropriability, explain the pro-cyclical behaviour of innovation even 
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if the opportunity cost of innovations, relative to production, falls during recessions. The reason 
is that innovators, knowing that imitation will take place at some point, will prefer to 
concentrate their R&D and innovation in booms, when appropriable returns are higher. Thus 
during recessions there would be under-provision of R&D, even in the absence of financial 
constraints. Fabrizio and Tsolmon (2014) test Barlevy’s hypothesis using a Compustat panel 
data set of 7,754 public US firms from 1975 to 2002. R&D investments and patented 
innovations turn out to be strongly pro-cyclical, especially in industries with weaker IP 
protection. Aghion et al. (2010) develop a model that shows that when capital markets are 
perfect the composition of investment –long term versus short term- is determined by their 
opportunity-cost, and the fraction of long-term investment over total investment is 
countercyclical. This prediction is reversed, however, when credit constraints are tight. They 
find empirical support for the model’s predictions using a panel of 21 OECD countries. In 
Aghion et al. (2012), using a large French firm-level data set during the period 1993-2004, they 
find evidence that indeed R&D investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, 
becoming  pro-cyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints in two types of sectors: those that 
depend on external finance or that are characterized by a low degree of asset tangibility. In 
addition, for more credit-constrained firms, R&D investment drops during recessions but does 
not increase proportionally during upturns. The bottom line of these contributions is that capital 
market imperfections and lack of, or limited, appropriability will induce both a static and a 
dynamic market failure when it comes to investing in R&D.  The question is then whether 
direct public support would reduce this failure. 
Previous empirical evidence in the case of Spain shows similar results. López-García et al. 
(2013) test the pro-cyclicality hypothesis of private investment in R&D and other intangible 
assets relative to total investment with a large sample of Spanish firms during the period 1991 
to 2010. They find investment in intangibles, including R&D, to be pro-cyclical for financially 
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constrained firms. These are typically young and small firms as well as firms in medium-high 
technological intensity industries. Beneito et al. (2015) obtain similar results when analyzing a 
large sample of Spanish manufacturing firms during the period 1990–2006.   
The 2008 recession. 
The 2008 crisis has prompted research on the behavior of business R&D in different countries. 
Results show quite generally a pro-cyclical reaction, although there are some differences across 
firm size, R&D intensity, competitive environment and type of innovation. Cincera et al. 
(2012) analyze the R&D survey of the top European R&D performers conducted in 2009, and 
find that R&D intensive firms were more likely to decrease R&D investment. Firm size is also 
found to matter, in a non-linear way, with investment falling with size up to a certain level, and 
then increasing with size. Similarly, Paunov (2012) finds that the crisis led many Latin-
American firms to stop innovation projects. Peters et al. (2014) use a large data set from several 
waves of the European Community Innovation Surveys (the first covering the years 1998-2000 
and the last covering the period 2008-2010) for about 20 EU member states to describe the 
behavior of several R&D and innovation indicators over the business cycle.3 They find that 
R&D investment follows mostly a pro-cyclical pattern, but that when it comes to the 
introduction of innovations in the market there are different reactions depending on the type of 
innovation. During recessions, the introduction of products that are new to the firm but not to 
the market increases, while innovations new to the market bunch in booms. Archibugi et al. 
(2013), analyze data from the European Innobarometer Survey 2009, and conclude that while 
before the crisis, incumbent enterprises were expanding their innovation investment, while just 
after the crisis innovation investment was driven by a number of small enterprises and new 
entrants. Arvanitis and Woerter (2013) find some heterogeneity in the response of Swiss 
manufacturing firms to the crisis, depending on firm size, R&D intensity and (lack of) price 
                                                          
3
 Their data includes about 414,474 firm-level observations from both manufacturing and service sectors. 
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competition. Giebel and Kraft (2019) study German manufacturing firms during the period 
2004-2011, and find that innovative firms using external sources to finance investment reduce 
their capital expenditures during the financial crisis more than innovative but not dependent on 
external finance firms, or even than non-innovative firms.4 Knudsen and Lien (2019) compare 
changes in investment in physical assets, R&D and human capital during recessions in a large 
sample of Norwegian firms, finding that R&D investment was more sensitive to credit shocks, 
while investment in physical assets was more sensitive to demand shocks. All this evidence 
points basically in the same direction. 
Regarding Spain, two studies focus on the effects of the 2008 crisis on R&D and innovation 
investment. Garicano and Steinwender (2016) distinguish between two types of shocks: credit 
shocks and demand shocks, on two types of investments, depending on their short or long time 
to payoff. They find that, over the period 2003 to 2010, credit shocks reduce the value of long 
term investments of manufacturing firms more than demand shocks, and more than investments 
with a shorter time to payoff. That is, with credit shocks, firms would be concerned about 
surviving in the short term, foregoing uncertain expected profits in the long run. This would 
imply that the 2008 credit crunch affected more severely R&D investments. Finally, Salas-
Fumás and Ortiz (2019), using Spanish CIS data over the period 2003 to 2014, find that firms’ 
perceptions of the credit crunch, as well as the demand shock, contributed to a fall in the 
proportion of firms introducing innovations during the recession, and increased the proportion 
of firms abandoning ongoing innovation projects. We can thus conclude that the behavior of 
firms during the 2008 crisis was quite similar across countries, even if it was not uniform across 
firms.  
 
                                                          
4
 It is also interesting to note that not only R&D behaves on average pro-cyclically, but there is evidence that the 
adoption of new technologies also does (Anzoategui et al. 2019). 
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Direct public support and the business cycle. 
All this body of evidence raises a policy question: would it be possible for a countercyclical 
direct public support to R&D to mitigate the dynamic failures predicted by the models 
described above? To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been thoroughly 
investigated.5 The answer hinges on the sign and size of the additionality effect during 
recessions relative to expansions.6 Only a small number of firm-level studies focus on the 
financial crisis years: Hud and Hussinger (2015), Aristei et al. (2017), and, in the case of Spain, 
Cruz Castro et al. (2019). Hud and Hussinger (2015) use German SMEs firm-level data for 
2006 to 2010 to estimate the overall treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of public support 
recipients. They find that it is positive, and therefore reject crowding out. They also investigate 
whether the ATT changes over time, regressing the estimated treatment effect on a set of time 
dummies, and find that the average treatment effect was significantly lower and even negative 
in 2009, when GDP fell in Germany, than in 2006. The estimated magnitudes suggest that in 
2009 firms changed their investment choices producing a crowding-out effect (op. cit., pg 
1852). Their research is limited, however, by the fact that their panel of firms is highly 
unbalanced, affecting the applicable empirical methodology. Aristei et al. (2017) estimate and 
compare the effect of public support in five European Union countries during the crisis period. 
Using firm-level data from each country, and restricting the treatment to direct support only, 
they do not find evidence of significant additionality in any of the five countries, including 
                                                          
5
 Most firm-level studies test whether direct public support –through grants and/or loans- crowds out private 
investment, or whether on the contrary it leverages private effort, and estimate the magnitude of this impact, but 
they pre-date the 2008 crisis. 
6
 The magnitude and sign of public spending multipliers over the business cycle have been investigated mostly at 
the macroeconomic level. Whether the fiscal multiplier is pro-cyclical is a controversial issue. For example, 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) find that in the US the average government spending multiplier is higher 
during recessions than during expansions. Canzoneri et al. (2016) corroborate that the magnitude of government 
spending multiplier is inversely correlated with the cycle. In contrast, Owyang et al. (2013) find no evidence that 
in the United States multipliers are higher during periods of high unemployment. Recently, Ramey and Zubairy 
(2018) obtain nuanced results. In view of these findings, we would expect the multiplier of direct support to R&D 
to vary over the cycle and possibly across countries, reflecting institutional features, industry composition and 
size distribution of firms. 
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Germany, as in Hud and Hussinger (2015).7 The main limitation is that the data used in their 
study are cross-sectional, and treatment effects for each year for a given country cannot be 
identified and thus compared across the cycle. Taken together these results suggest that the 
additionality of R&D support has been pro-cyclical. Cruz Castro et al. (2019) use a panel of 
Spanish CIS firms in 2008 and in 2012 to analyze whether recipients of regional direct support 
to R&D were less likely to discontinue R&D activities in 2012 (during the crisis) than in 2008. 
They find that regional support allowed firms’ R&D activities that would have been otherwise 
cutback. This is a form of positive additionality during the recession.   
A final issue that has been relatively neglected in the literature are the dynamic effects of direct 
subsidies: effects may not be immediate; they can also be temporary or long-lasting. The 
evidence so far is disparate. Colombo et al (2013), for instance, find that in Italy public support 
has a temporary effect on private R&D investment. In contrast, Arqué and Mohnen’s (2015), 
find that in Spain one-shot subsidies cause a substantial increase in both the share of R&D 
performing firms and on average R&D expenditures over time. Einio (2014) finds that R&D 
subsidies in Finland do not have an immediate impact on productivity, but they do in the long-
term. Karhunen and Houvari (2015), who look at the timing of the effects of R&D subsidies 
granted in the period 2002 to 2007 to Finnish SMEs on labor productivity, employment and 
human capital up to five years after a subsidy is granted, find that effects are often significant 
one and two years after treatment. They study an expansionary period, so the open question is 
whether effects are similar during a recession. 
Our research analyzes in a comprehensive way the effects of public support during an 
expansion and during a recession, as well as the dynamic effects of this support on R&D 
                                                          
7
 The data consist of nation-wide representative, cross-sectional samples of manufacturing firms from the EFIGE 
(European Firms in the Global Economy) survey conducted in 2010, with questions referring to the period 2007-
2009. The countries included in their study are France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. They all provide direct 
support, and all but Germany also provide tax incentives. For information about this data set, see 
http://bruegel.org/publications/datasets/efige/. 
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investment and on the allocation of employee time to R&D activities. Furthermore, we take 
into account the duration or frequency of support, offering novel insights. The use of a large 
balanced panel of firms allows us to use empirical methods to deal with selection both on 
observable and on unobservable factors, and to estimate dynamic impacts over the cycle.  In 
particular, we test the following hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: The strong financial component of 
the crisis would make innovating, credit-constrained firms more likely to apply for and obtain 
direct support. Hypothesis 2: The effect of support on privately financed R&D investment is 
likely to be lower during recessions than in expansions because of reduced availability of both 
internal and external funds. Hypothesis 3:  Access to public support is likely to allow innovators 
to hoard their skilled workers in times of crisis. Because it takes time to build skilled teams to 
perform R&D and innovation, and this human capital is likely to be firm-specific, supported 
firms are more likely to increase the time allocation of R&D activities (Bloom et al. 2013). 
Thus, public support would have a positive additionality effect in the allocation of skilled 
employees to knowledge-generating activities, even if monetary investment does not increase 
significantly. Hypothesis 4: The effect of a one-shot subsidy is likely to be smaller than longer 
treatment patterns because the scope and nature of the innovation projects in the first case are 
likely to be limited.   
 
3. Data  
The Spanish government provides support to business R&D since the mid-80’s through two 
types of programs: direct support –subsidies and loans– and indirect support through tax 
incentives.  Regional governments and the European Union also provide direct support, but 
national funding is largely the most important source. Most direct national support from is 
channeled through a public agency, the Centro para el Desarrollo Tecnológico Industrial 
(CDTI). The agency can finance up to 75% of the cost of a project; up to 30% of the cost can 
13 
 
be supported with a non-refundable subsidy, depending on the nature of projects. The policy 
has been overall quite stable in terms of programs and eligibility criteria, except for two 
changes that took place in 2008. That year some programs were reclassified in order to comply 
with EU regulations on state aids, and in addition, from then on the cost of physical assets 
(instruments and equipment) is no longer eligible for funding. These adjustments lead to a drop 
of CDTI’s committed funds for direct support that year. Direct support had expanded 
significantly from 2002 to 2007, almost tripling in nominal terms and reaching €1311M in 
2007.8 It fell by about 24% in 2008, but increased almost to the 2007 level from 2009 to 2011, 
in an explicit government effort to help innovative firms weather the crisis. This effort could 
not be sustained, however, and from 2012 to 2014 the volume of direct funding oscillated 
between €780M and €843M. Regional government funding also experienced a significant 
contraction in this period (Cruz Castro et al. 2017). There was, thus, an overall reduced supply 
of funds from 2012 on.  
We use annual firm-level data from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC), 
produced by the National Statistical Institute (INE) and based on the European Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS), during the period extending from 2005 to 2014. PITEC provides a 
broad range of information on innovation activities, including innovation and R&D 
expenditures, public funds obtained for R&D and perceived barriers to innovation, along with 
sales volume, human capital and firm’s age. In this study we essentially focus on SMEs (firms 
with less than 200 employees).9 The bulk of firms in the economy are SMEs. They tend to be 
                                                          
8
 Spain also provides indirect support to R&D through tax incentives. Up to the crisis, the volume of grants and 
loans was higher than indirect support (Busom, Corchuelo, and Martinez-Ros 2017). According to the OECD, 
however, this changed during the crisis years and beyond: the share of R&D tax incentives as a percentage of total 
support was about 25% in 2006, but it increased as direct support suffered severe cuts. See OECD, R&D Tax 
Incentive Indicators, http://oe.cd/rdtax, July 2017 and OECD STI Scoreboard 2017.  
9
 We decide to use 200 as the size threshold to be in correspondence to the sampling frame used by PITEC, which 
comprises four sub-samples: i) firms with 200 employees or more; ii) firms of any size with intramural R&D 
expenditures. The remaining sample is representative of firms with fewer than 200 but more than 10 employees: 
it includes firms reporting external but no intramural R&D expenditures, as well as firms with no innovation 
expenditure at all. We can also obtain a balanced panel of 1,169 large firms (62% of the unbalanced panel) and 
replicate the same analysis as for SMEs. An important limitation for the sample of large firms, however, is the 
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more sensitive than large firms to credit supply (Mach and Wolken, 2011; Artola and Genre, 
2011; Schmitz, 2018). In addition, a major goal of public support programs is to engage SMEs 
in R&D and innovation activities. In the case of CDTI, between 73% to 87% of the projects 
approved were carried out by SMEs; their share in total CDTI funding oscillated between 63% 
and 76% in the period 2005 to 2015. 
From the original PITEC unbalanced panel we obtain a balanced panel of 9,339 firms that 
includes all SMEs that stay in the sample for the whole 10 year period.  This allows us to 
eliminate spurious differences that could be generated by changes in the composition of the 
sample.10 We further limit the sample to firms that invested in innovation at least once in the 
period under study, the idea being to exclude firms that do not intend to innovate (i.e., those 
that report that they do not need to innovate at all).11 We impose three more filters. First, we 
drop firms that experienced a merger or takeover process, as well as drastic employment 
incidents. Second, we eliminate observations with extreme values or zero sales. Finally, we 
also exclude from the analysis primary and construction sectors. The final balanced panel 
includes 3,356 SMEs.12 All monetary variables are expressed in constant values at 2010 
prices.13 The time span encompasses the expansion period (2005-2008), the recession years 
(2009-2012) and the modest beginning of the recovery (2013-2014). Since there is some 
                                                          
difficulty to find a satisfactory sample of untreated counterfactuals to allow for reliable inference. We report very 
tentative results in section 5.4. 
10
 One implication of this restriction is the possible survivorship bias. Unfortunately, we are unable to control for 
this potential source of bias. In particular, from the data we cannot distinguish a firm for which data are missing 
and a firm that closes down. In an attempt to assess whether this might affect our results we also carry out 
estimations using the unbalanced panel. 
11
 This corresponds to 8,007 innovative firms. 
12
 The balanced panel sample of SMEs represents 53% of firms in the unbalanced SMEs panel.  
13
 It should be noted that continuous variables in PITEC - the volume of sales, exports volume or total expenditure 
on innovation- undergo a process of anonymization, unlike qualitative or percentage variables. López (2011) 
compared estimates obtained with the original and anonymous data and concluded that the anonymization 
procedure does not generate significant biases. Nevertheless, both the description and results of the empirical 
analysis should be interpreted with some caution. Tables A1.1 and A1.2 provide the definitions of the variables 
used and summary statistics respectively. 
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uncertainty about classifying the whole year 2013 as crisis or beginning of recovery year, we 
later check the robustness of results under the alternative classification.  
Our empirical analysis will focus on the effect of total direct public support (loans and direct 
subsidies) from central and regional governments.14 Both jurisdictions jointly represented 81% 
of direct support in 2015. The advantage of using this variable, reported in PITEC, is its annual 
availability, while separate information by jurisdiction is available only for three-year periods. 
The main disadvantage is that observed firm participation will reflect a combination of 
allocation criteria by both central and regional agencies, which may not always coincide.  
We first focus on the analysis of SMEs, and refer to large firms in section 5.4. Table 1 shows 
that the number of SMEs investing in innovation in the balanced panel decreased steadily since 
2005. Innovation expenditures are defined in the CIS as those that aim at developing and 
introducing innovations that are new to the firm or to the market. They include investment in 
R&D, which is quantitatively the most important of these expenditures. The number of firms 
investing in R&D in our sample dropped by 28% over the period. The share of R&D performers 
receiving public support fell from 35% in 2005 to 28% in 2014. Furthermore the average rate 
of public funding among supported firms fell from about 40% in 2005 to 31% in 2014.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Firms can get support for up to three years in a single application and can apply for and obtain 
support repeatedly. PITEC does not provide information on the duration of support to a project, 
on rejected applications, or on other features of funded projects; we only observe whether a 
firm declares having public support a given year. Tables 2 and 3 below show, respectively, the 
frequency of participation over the ten-year period and one-lag transition probabilities of public 
                                                          
14In Spain, the main users and beneficiaries of R&D tax incentives are large firms. Busom, Corchuelo and 
Martínez-Ros (2014) find that in the case of financially constrained manufacturing SMEs are more likely to turn 
to direct support. The database we use, PITEC, does not include information on the use of tax incentives, so we 
are unable to investigate how the crisis affected the use of tax incentives. 
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funding. Table 2 shows that about 55% of firms in the balanced panel received public support 
at some point, and about 40% of participant firms did so for one or two years. One third of the 
firms participated for six years or more, suggesting that a substantial proportion of supported 
firms received R&D subsidies on a regular basis. It is not possible to know, as explained above, 
whether this is the outcome of firms in this group performing long-term projects lasting 3 or 
more years and applying for support every 3 years, or whether it is the outcome of success in 
repeated annual applications.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 shows that both investment in innovation and receiving public support are highly 
persistent. About 71% of recipients of support in one year remained supported the following 
year, while 29% did not. Furthermore, 93% of non-supported firms in [t] maintained their status 
in [t+1]. We also find high persistence of investment in innovation effort: each year about 72% 
of firms that did not have innovation activities remained in the same situation the following 
year, while 28% engaged in innovation. In turn, 90% of firms that had innovation activities one 
year continued doing so in the following year. These facts are in line with those found in Peters 
(2009) and Busom et al. (2017).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In addition we observe that some firms will be supported only during the growth period, others 
during the recession others in both, and finally some may never participate. This will be of 
critical importance in defining the empirical strategy. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
Several factors may induce a different response of firms to direct R&D support over the 
business cycle.  One is that the nature of applicants may change because of variation in firms’ 
incentives to apply for support or to changes in policy priorities leading to changes in the 
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selection rules in expansions and in recessions. This would be a compositional effect. A second 
factor may be that the nature of specific shocks affects firms’ response to support. Firms’ R&D 
related decisions might be more sensitive to a tightening than to an expansion of credit. SMEs 
especially may cut down long-term investments in recessions characterized by a credit squeeze 
faster and more intensely than they can increase them in expansions.  In this case a given 
amount of public support may be more effective in helping SMEs maintain their R&D activities 
during recessions than in inducing firms to engage or expand their innovation activities during 
expansions.  
What we do next is to check the stability of the determinants of firm participation in 
government support programs through the 2005-2014 period. We are interested in testing 
whether the evolution of the firms’ sales and firm’s perception about external funding 
constraints are correlated with program participation status.  Controlling for this, we will then 
look at different firm treatment patterns and estimate the impact of public support before, 
during and after the crisis conditional on a given pattern. 
 
4.1. Access to public support over the cycle 
We estimate a random-effects dynamic probit participation model for each of the three distinct 
periods: Before the crisis (2005 – 2008), during the crisis (2009 – 2012) and after the crisis 
(2013 – 2014). As explained above we observe whether firms have obtained direct support in 
a given year, but do not know whether a non-participant is a rejected applicant. Estimates 
reflect the joint outcome of the firms’ decisions to apply for it and the selection rule that the 
administration follows.  
The observed discrete variable  is associated with an underlying latent variable ∗. The 
probability of participating is assumed to be a function of the firm’s participation state in the 
previous year, ;   a set of lagged observable covariates ;  an unobservable time-
18 
 
invariant firm-specific effect ; and of a time-varying idiosyncratic random error term 	. 
The individual-specific unobserved permanent component  allows firms who are 
homogenous in their observed characteristics to be heterogeneous in unobserved permanent 
features. The model is the following: 

∗ =  + ,
  +  + 	,    [1] 
Variables  are assumed to be exogenous with respect to 	,, but may be endogenous with 
respect to unobserved individual effects , as well as the initial conditions . To consistently 
estimate this model, Wooldridge (2005) proposed modelling the distribution of  conditional 
on the initial conditions, , and all lagged values for each exogenous covariates  =
(,,… , ). Alternatively, Mundlak’s (1978) approach replaces lagged exogenous 
variables by their time average. In this case, the individual effects model can be expressed as 
follows: 
 =  +  + ̅ + ,     [2] 
The final model is:  

∗ =  +  +  + ,
  + ̅ + ,  [3] 
One of the novelties of our specification is that we test whether public support is correlated 
with firm’s sales growth in the previous period and whether this correlation changes over the 
phases of the business cycle. We would expect companies suffering from sales contractions 
not to plan new, costly innovation projects and therefore would not apply to public support 
programs, as these do not fund 100% of a project cost. Innovative start-ups, for instance, are 
more likely to suffer from venture capital drought in recessions (Paik and Woo, 2013). It is 
possible, however, that firms that have unsupported, ongoing projects turn to public support 
when external and internal sources of funds deteriorate in order to be able to finish them. If the 
first effect dominates, we would expect the correlation between sales growth and the 
probability of participating to be positive.    
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We also test whether the correlation with perceived barriers to innovation –such as access to 
external funding and demand uncertainty- remains constant and significant over time. As 
control variables we will include firm size, age, export status, group membership, foreign 
ownership, the percentage of employees with higher education, the ratio of R&D researchers 
over employment, cooperation for innovation activities, continuous R&D performers and use 
of intellectual property rights, in line with previous research. Moreover, as innovation 
expenditures are found to be persistent in the literature, previous innovation expenditures will 
be controlled for. All variables are lagged one period. Finally, industry dummies are included 
to control for sector heterogeneity. All variables are defined in Table A1.1 in the Appendix. 
 
4.2 Impact of public funding on firms’ investment in innovation over time 
The study of dynamic effects of public policies is an important aspect of policy evaluation that 
often demands methodological developments. A longitudinal framework raises many 
challenges because of issues related to dynamic selection into participation, duration, timing 
and multiple program participation are to be faced. A case in point is the micro-level evaluation 
of labour market policies (Lechner and Wiehler, 2013; Lechner, 2015). In this literature, a 
matching approach has been combined with differences-in-differences, a strategy that may be 
appropriate in our case as well, as we discuss next.   
Direct support is received by firms at different points in time. Effects may last more than one 
period, and vary over time depending on the business cycle phase at the time when support is 
granted. Thinking in terms of the design of an ideal experiment, the key issue to obtain the 
counterfactual is defining the appropriate control group for treated firms at the time of 
treatment. A non-treated firm should be used as a comparison unit for one treated at time  only 
if both have the same treatment history before the time of treatment and the untreated status 
does not change for some time. In addition, potential outcomes for firms that receive support 
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twice in a program should be allowed to differ from those that receive it just once. We therefore 
need to take into account participation experience at the time of treatment. Treatment effects 
should be estimated conditional on a given starting year when the firm is granted support and 
on when it leaves the funding scheme. 
The experiment would require performing a random allocation of identical firms to treatment 
in different phases of the cycle, and compare the outcomes (,) of treated and untreated firms 
over time.  To set this experiment up, let , equal the (log) innovation outcome for the firm i 
at time t, and the subsidy treatment be a binary random variable , = 0,1!.15 We would 
observe two possible outcomes for each pair of firms, depending on the firm’s participation 
state. It could be either , or ,. Besides, assuming that outcomes of treated and non-treated 
firms have the same trend before treatment:  
#$,%, ,	' = #$,%	'      [4] 
Then the causal effect (() is obtained as follows: 
#$,%, ,	' − #$,%	' = (     [5] 
To allow the treatment effect to vary over time, let *,+, be an interaction term between 
support status (,) and period dt, where dt is a time dummy that switches on for observations 
obtained after support is granted. Treatment effects in Equation [6] below could be estimated 
by a difference in difference model using longitudinal data.  
, =  + ∑ (+,*,+,
.
,/ + ,    [6] 
where  (, ∙ 1) = *,+,, and  ,=, − #$,%, ,	'.  
The estimator (+, measures the average change in firm’s innovation outcome between firms 
that obtained support in period  + 2 and firms that did not in the same period. However, when 
assignment to treatment is not random, equation [6] entails a naïve comparison between 
                                                          
15
 A continuous treatment variable could be also used; however, information on the amount of support is often 
unavailable or of low quality, so in practice a binary treatment is employed.  
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supported and unsupported firms because it might be the case that companies that are already 
successful in conducting innovations are more likely to apply and obtain support; furthermore, 
participation status at t and future potential outcomes may be correlated. Thus, the assumption 
expressed in [4] would be violated if we do not control for the systematic differences among 
firms. 
To correct for this bias in observational data, different econometric techniques have been 
proposed. One of the most widely used approaches is matching on observables.16 Let’s suppose 
a firm receives support in 2006 only, so from the pool of non-policy users (control group), we 
should search for a similar firm (based on observables) that remains untreated over the whole 
period and then estimate their difference in conditional outcomes over time. Unbiased 
estimation of the average treatment effect relies entirely, however, on the observed covariates 
(unconfoundedness assumption). Thus, wiping out any unobservable-to-analyst characteristic 
that may bias the estimation is highly recommended. Athey and Imbens (2017) suggest that 
methods that combine modeling of the conditional mean with matching or with weighting 
based on the propensity-score, produce quite robust estimators and are recommended for 
effective causal estimation using observational data.  
To overcome the drawbacks of using simple matching –mainly the existence of unobservable 
permanent differences- we use Conditional DiD: we apply the difference-in-differences 
approach to the sample of firms that satisfies the common support condition (defined as the 
overlap of the distribution of propensity score for supported and unsupported firms).17 Using 
the matched sample already makes supported and control firms more similar than an 
unmatched sample of firms would be. In our case we use nearest neighbor matching. The 
estimation model is,  
                                                          
16
 Control-function, instrumental variables and selection-models are also used. Cerulli (2015) discusses the 
advantages and drawbacks of each of these approaches. 
17
 This method has been implemented for example by Heckman et al., (1998); Smith and Todd (2005).  
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, =  + 3 + ∑ (+,*,+,
.
,/ + ∑ 4,
 5 + ,   [7] 
The model includes two main effects. First, it assumes that there is an individual time-invariant 
heterogeneity component () which is unobserved, and a year effect,  3, which is modelled 
as a time-year dummy variable. Second, it includes an interaction term *,, the same as in 
equation [6], where (, ∙ 1) = *,+,. 4, is a vector of firm time-varying covariates. Note 
that the sum on the right-hand side allows for q leads of participation ((+, (+, … , (+.).   
We will assess the impact of public support over time on two different outcomes. The first is 
investment in innovation per employee. The second outcome the number of employees 
(researchers, technicians and auxiliary staff) dedicated to R&D in full-time equivalent units 
(FTE). Both outcomes provide complementary information on the effects of subsidies, as firms 
might reallocate highly qualified workers between production and research tasks without 
changing innovation budgets.18 Interpretation of  ( depends on which dependent variable is 
used in estimating [7]. When the measured outcome is total investment (private investment 
plus the subsidy) per employee, ( ≤ 0 implies full crowding out. If instead the outcome is 
investment net of the subsidy, or the employee time dedicated to R&D, then  ( = 0 implies that 
neither additionality nor crowding-out effect occur;  ( < 0 indicates that some crowding-out is 
at work, and ( > 0 indicates crowding-in effects.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Access to direct support over the cycle 
We estimate a dynamic probit model for each of the three distinct phases of the cycle. The 
dependent variable takes the value one if the firm has received public funding, and zero 
otherwise. Table 4 shows the marginal effects, calculated at the average value. Columns 1, 4, 
                                                          
18
 The data source (PITEC) provides detailed information about R&D personnel in full-time equivalent (FTE), 
following the OECD guidelines.  
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and 7 display the maximum likelihood estimates of specification 3, using the lag of public 
funding (t-1), its initial value (funding at ), and different lagged explanatory variables () 
in order to control for observed heterogeneity. Columns 2, 5, and 8 report results using 
Mundlak’s specification, and columns 3, 6 and 9 show estimates of pooled probit models. Both 
dynamic estimators lead to similar and significant coefficient estimates for lagged public 
funding, which is a measure of true state dependence of participation, while pooled probit 
estimates overestimate persistence, as expected.19 Firms that have previously participated in 
public funding programs have higher probability of doing so later. This result is close to 
findings by Busom et al. (2017), who used a similar model with a panel of Spanish 
manufacturing firms over the period 2001–2008. Estimates suggest that persistence is slightly 
increasing during the recession phase and immediately after. We interpret this as an indicator 
that the probability to obtain support of previous non-participants fell with the recession. The 
initial value of public funding is also significant, implying that there is an important correlation 
between unobserved heterogeneity and the initial condition.   
We do not find evidence that the firm’s sales growth is correlated with participation in any of 
the phases of the cycle. Interestingly, firms that reported facing difficulties to access external 
funding are more likely to participate during the expansion phase, but not during the recession. 
A plausible explanation is that many firms delay innovation plans during recessions and do not 
even search for support. They plan to engage in innovation activities –especially R&D- during 
expansions, and seek public support then because even during expansions SMEs are likely to 
face limited access to external funds for R&D. It is also possible that during recession years all 
firms face financial constraints, so that this perception would not explain differences in 
participation.  The correlation with other variables such as the firm’s human capital, continuous 
                                                          
19
 Recall that the duration of support is not known, and that about 49% firms are supported for more than 3 years. 
This is likely to lead to a high estimated coefficient.   
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R&D performers, cooperation, and domestic ownership remains positive and stable throughout 
the cycle. We also find that continuous R&D performers are more likely to participate 
throughout the cycle, and marginal effects are slightly higher during the crisis. Another 
interesting finding is that the sign of the innovation effort is the opposite of that of the 
corresponding time-averaged variable. In particular, the level of innovation effort is negatively 
correlated with the probability of participating. However, the time-average values of the level 
of innovation effort show a positive and significant impact on the probability of getting support. 
This result could be an indication that previous R&D effort decreases the likelihood of 
receiving support; however, in the long-run firms investing heavily in R&D have a larger 
probability of receiving funding. Finally, firms from high-tech services are more likely to 
participate during the recession and recovery.20 From these results we conclude that there is no 
evidence that changes in the impact of support on firms’ innovation investment could be 
attributed to changes in the joint outcome of firms’ application decision and the public agency’s 
selection rule. This concurs with Hud and Hussinger’s (2015) results for Germany.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 reports the estimated average probability of being supported in period , given 
participation in  − 1, based on the results in columns 2, 5 and 8. Persistence is found to be 
higher after the onset of the crisis, suggesting that a number of firms were repeatedly supported 
through this period. To summarize, the process of being granted support seems to be quite 
stable along the phases of the business cycle, as basically the same subset of variables are 
correlated with the likelihood of obtaining support over the three periods.21  
                                                          
20
 We have also estimated the same model for the unbalanced panel, with 18,664 observations and 6,623 firms. 
We find that most results are very similar, and that firms that are in the balanced panel are more likely to 
participate. The main difference we find is that sales growth is positively correlated with the probability of 
participating. We report results of this robustness exercise in section 5.3, and provide the corresponding tables as 
Supplementary Material. 
21
 The size of the sample of large firms in the balanced panel allows us to estimate a dynamic random effects 
model for receiving direct support each phase of the business cycle, and compare estimates with those obtained 
for SMEs. Results are quite similar with respect to persistence of participation, which is higher during the 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5. 2 Impact of direct support on firms’ investment in innovation 
To perform the experiment described in section 4 and estimate the average treatment effects 
on the treated we have to choose a valid control group. This involves taking into account the 
firm’s timing of participation: firms that obtain grants during the initial expansion phase should 
be compared with firms that are not treated during the whole period; and firms that receive 
funding during the recession should be compared to (matched) firms untreated during the 
recession and that were not treated previously either, as treatment effects can last for longer 
than the treatment year. To this end, we construct treatment patterns or histories. The basic idea 
of the treatment pattern is intuitive:  a time window during which the firms may have received 
funding. We proceed as follows. First, we divide the 2005-2014 period into three sub-periods 
or time-windows, according to the evolution of GDP growth as shown in Figure 1: 2006-2008;  
2009-2012 and 2013-14. We then consider the timing of participation of each firm within each 
phase, that is, whether a firm participates in all, two or one of the three periods. Next, we focus 
on four treatment patterns that last one and two years within each time window (see table 6 
below). Finally, since we do not know the firm’s participation history before 2005, we perform 
the analysis for the sample of firms that were not participating in 2005, that is we drop from 
the sample firms that were participating that year. 
We match firms treated at a given point in time with controls –firms that never participate– 
through the nearest neighbor matching procedure. For the expansion period, 2006-8, we use 
the estimated probability of participating in 2006 (the propensity score) using covariate values 
for 2005. The sample includes firms that exhibit a particular treatment pattern and matched 
                                                          
recession. Unlike SMEs, however, for large we do not find evidence that the probability of participation was 
correlated with lack of access to external funding. We report results in section 5.4. 
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firms that never participate. For the crisis period the propensity score is estimated with data for 
2008 with lagged covariates.22 Table 6 shows the patterns studied, the number of treated firms 
in each pattern, and the number of potential controls.23  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The purpose of matching on the propensity score is to obtain a sample of controls for treated 
firms such that the joint distribution of the set of covariates for treated and non-treated firms 
overlaps. Table 7 reports the t-test of equality of the means of the matching covariates used in 
the analysis for each participation pattern. Before matching there are significant differences 
between treated and non-treated firms, especially with respect to employees with higher 
education, firm age, support from UE and innovation intensity in t-1. After matching, 
differences are no longer significant, and the mean bias drops significantly. The quality of the 
match after discarding some observations is high. Overall, we can safely conclude that 
balancing is satisfactory.24 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
We next estimate the model specified in equation [7] for each of the treatment patterns on Table 
6 and each of the two outcomes of interest.25 We estimate four versions of this equation: i) a 
standard DiD model without controls using the whole sample of treated and untreated firms; 
ii) a DiD with the same sample including all the controls used in the propensity score matching 
(DiD+controls); iii) a weighted version of  DiD, where observations are weighted according to 
the propensity score (DiD weighted), and iv) a DiD model using only the sample of treated and 
                                                          
22
 Estimates of participation probabilities for each of the treatment patterns are available as supplementary 
materials. 
23
 We cannot analyze all treatment patterns because the number of treated firms is too small in some cases. 
24
 The distribution of the propensity-score for treated and control firms before and after matching is available. as 
supplementary materials. 
25
 We focus on total investment in innovation per employee and number of employees allocated to R&D activities. 
We decide not to estimate the effect on net investment because the reported amount of subsidy received is very 
noisy.  
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matched controls (DiD Matched).26 Tables A1.3 and A1.4 in the Appendix report the estimated 
value of the treatment effect every year since participation for firms exhibiting each treatment 
pattern. We find that treatment estimates vary depending on the estimation method. DiD and 
DiD with controls generally overestimate treatment effects compared to DiD-weighted or DiD-
matched. Figure 2 below displays estimated treatment effects for the treated over time when 
the outcome is the number of employees allocated to R&D activities in FTE (Table A1.4), by 
estimation method.  It shows that while all methods produce similar estimates of effects of 
support in the period 2006-2008 when firms participate twice, DiD and DiD-weighted tend to 
overestimate effects relative to the other two methods when firms participate only once in the 
period. This suggests that adding matching or controls to DiD provide a more adequate control 
group. Effect estimates during the expansion exhibit an inverse U-shaped pattern for the next 
3 to 4 years, drop to 0, and then have again a positive but weaker effect thereafter. During the 
recession DiD and DiD-weighted also seem to overestimate treatment effects. However, during 
the recession, estimated treatment effects are positive.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Our preferred estimates are those obtained with DiD combined with matching. In the case of 
innovation investment per employee, we find that treatment effects of firms that participated 
once during the expansion phase are higher than treatment effects for firms that participated 
once during the recession (see Table A1.3 for detailed results for treatment patterns 1 and 3 
respectively). In fact, we do not find significant effects during the recession. Although we can 
reject full crowding out for one-year participants before the crisis, we cannot reject it during 
the downturn, in line with the results found by Hud and Hussinger (2015). However, for firms 
                                                          
26
 Weighting observations by their inverse probability of treatment was proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2001). 
In this case firms that participate in the program are given weight of 1/p and those that did not are weighted by a 
factor equal to 1/(1 − p), where p is the estimated probability of being supported (the propensity score). That is, 
each firm is weighted with the inverse of the probability of the treatment. Intuitively, treated firms that resemble 
the controls are given more weight, and control cases that look like they should have got the treatment also get 
more weight. 
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that participate twice –we now compare treatment pattern 2 to treatment pattern 4- we find that 
treatment effects might have been significant and last longer during the recession years.27  
When we examine treatment effects on the allocation of human capital to innovation activities 
–R&D employees in full-time equivalent- we find that, according to the DiD+Matching 
estimation, treatment effects are somewhat higher and last longer during the recession years, 
suggesting a counter-cyclical behavior whether firms participate one year or two years (see 
Table A1.4). Figure 3 illustrates the differences of estimated treatment effects during expansion 
and recession years for two outcomes (total innovation investment per employee and human 
resources allocated to innovation, in FTE) and two treatment patterns. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Our results suggest two conclusions. First, effects of public support over the business cycle 
would depend on the duration of support, possibly reflecting different innovation project types. 
And second, while the effect of support on innovation investment is smaller –null- during the 
recession years relative to expansion years, receiving support allowed firms to protect and 
expand their investment in R&D human capital relative to non-participants’ investment. 
Clearly, public support does not seem to induce higher investment in innovation activities in 
recession years relative to expansion years for firms that participate only one-year. For these 
firms the multiplier effect of public support in monetary investment would be pro-cyclical. 
These firms, however, allocate more human resources to R&D during the recession, and for a 
longer period of time. Our interpretation is that firms receiving public support during the 
recession reduced and reassigned the composition of innovation activities such that they could 
preserve their most valuable asset, human capital. For firms with more ambitious or lengthier 
innovation projects, as measured by a participation length of two years, the multiplier for both 
                                                          
27
 Note that spillovers from additional R&D activities induced by the policy flowing from treated firms to 
untreated firms with some delay could distort the true causal effect. 
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investment and employee time allocated to R&D is found to be counter-cyclical. The duration 
of the impact is longer as well. 28 
On a cautionary note, we do not intend to imply, from these results, that allocating public 
subsidies to firms for one year is not a good policy. The magnitude of the multiplier, usually 
known as the extent of additionality in the innovation policy evaluation literature, does not 
imply that the policy is welfare increasing, as Takalo et al. (2017) and Lach et al. (2017) show.  
 
5.3 Robustness 
We address several issues regarding the robustness of our results. We analyse their sensitivity 
to using the unbalanced panel, the presence of anticipation effects, and the inclusion of 2013 
in the definition of the crisis period. First, we have tested the effects of using the unbalanced 
panel; employing the same methods to estimate treatment effects, we obtain very similar 
results. Second, firms may react to a policy before its implementation, so that the outcome at t 
would be correlated with future program participation at t+1 or t+2 (anticipation effects). For 
instance, a firm wishing to obtain direct support might decide to improve its technological 
capabilities to increase its chances of obtaining a grant (Cerulli, 2015). To test for anticipatory 
effects, we follow Autor (2003) and extend equation [7], adding some leads for future 
participation in public innovation programs. This test also allows us to validate a fundamental 
assumption for any DiD strategy, in which the outcome in treatment and control group would 
follow the same time trend in the absence of the treatment. We estimate the following equation: 
, =  + 3 + ∑ (,*,,
.
,/ + ∑ (+,*,+,
.
,/ + , [7b] 
                                                          
28
 It is possible that the firms that received public support during the recession were those firms willing to take 
the risk of acting counter-cyclical and increasing R&D. However, in absence of information on whether a firm 
applied for support, rather than just obtained support, we cannot investigate the impact the recession may have 
had on application behavior. From annual CDTI reports, we just know that the total number of applications kept 
increasing from 2005 to 2013.  
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If τ(-δ) is not statistically significant then pre-treatment trends between treated and non-treated 
can be considered as similar. We do not find strong evidence of anticipation in terms of 
investment in innovation per employee, although for treatment pattern 3 the coefficient for year 
2008 is significant at the 5% level. Finally, in the baseline estimations, year 2013 is considered 
to be the start of the recovery period. The Spanish Business Cycle Dating Committee, linked 
to the Spanish Economic Association (http://asesec.org/CFCweb/en/) characterizes the crisis 
in Spain as a double recession. It sets the peak of economic activity in the second quarter of 
2008, with a pause the fourth quarter of 2009 to the fourth quarter of 2010, and then a second 
recession with the trough in the second quarter of 2013. It is thus not obvious whether this year 
should be included in the crisis period or in the recovery period. To test the robustness of the 
analysis above, we re-estimate the model with 2013 classified as crisis period, and find that the 
main results hold.29  
 
5.4 Large firms: tentative results. 
From the same source, PITEC, we build a balanced panel of about 1,169 large firms with more 
than 200 employees. About 66% of large firms were investing in innovation in 2005, and 49% 
in R&D. These percentages increased slightly up to 2009, and then dropped again to the levels 
of 2005 by 2014. Likewise, while in 2009 and 2010 public support reached about 41% of R&D 
performers, this percentage had declined to 32% by 2014. The average ratio of public support 
to total R&D was close to about 25% during the expansion and early recession years, but fell 
to 17% later. Most R&D performers received support for two years or more. Both innovation 
and participation status are highly persistent (see Tables A2.1 to A2.3 in Appendix 2).   
The size of the sample of firms in the balanced panel receiving direct support allows us to 
estimate a dynamic random-effects model for each phase of the business cycle and compare 
                                                          
29
 All robustness estimation results are available as supplementary material. 
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estimates with those obtained for SMEs. Results are quite similar with respect to persistence 
of participation, which is higher during the recession. As before, this is consistent with the 
hypothesis that budget cuts lead to a sharp reduction in the probability that previously untreated 
firms would obtain support during the recession. Unlike SMEs, however, we do not find 
evidence of correlation between the probability of participation and lack of access to external 
funding (see table A2.4 in Appendix 2).  
When looking at treatment patterns over the cycle, we find that the number of firms 
experiencing the same participation pattern is too small to obtain reliable estimates of treatment 
effects for the same cases as for SMEs. Table 8 shows the number of treated and potential 
controls for the cases analogous to SMEs.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Because of the small number of observations for these treatment patterns, we tentatively 
estimate treatment effects only for patterns 1 and 3. The estimated effects on both total 
innovation investment per worker and the employee time dedicated to R&D activities are not 
significantly different from zero both during the expansion and during the recession, except for 
firms participating one year during the expansion (treatment pattern 1). In the latter case, we 
find an immediate positive and significant treatment effect on the employee time dedicated to 
R&D activities in 2008 (tables A2.5 andA2.6 in Appendix 2). Results suggest that large firms 
are less responsive to public support than SMEs. These findings, however, are to be considered 
only extremely tentative given the available sample sizes.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The global economic and financial crisis that unleashed in 2008 had a globally negative impact 
on business investment in R&D and innovation. In some countries public funding of R&D, 
whether carried out by the public or private sectors, also dropped because of fiscal 
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consolidation. The risk of divergent productivity growth paths that this entails is bothersome. 
To assess the cost of decreasing public support to business R&D, we analyze whether its effects 
on firms’ investment in innovation activities differs across expansions and recessions. The 
research questions we have focused on are: 1) Does firms’ access to support vary over the 
business cycle? 2) Does the impact of support remain constant over the cycle? 3) How does 
public support affect private R&D investment and R&D employment? 4) Are effects sensitive 
to the length or frequency of program participation, and how long do effects last? To the best 
of our knowledge, existing research is sparse and not as comprehensive as the analysis we carry 
out here.  
With respect to the first question, we find that, in line with the results of Hud and Hussinger 
(2015) for Germany, the allocation of R&D subsidies in Spain did not change significantly 
during the crisis years. This means that differences in effects during expansions and recessions 
are unlikely to be induced by changes in the type of firms obtaining public support. Regarding 
the remaining questions, our richer data compared to previous studies produce more nuanced 
results. We find that the additionality effect varies depending on the firms’ treatment pattern 
and with the type of outcome. Timing and length of participation matter, with longer treatment 
leading to higher additionality. We also find that while the impact of public support during the 
recession years is pro-cyclical for investment in innovation in monetary terms, when looking 
at the time allocation to R&D activities the additionality effect is higher and longer during the 
recession. These results are robust for SMEs. Overall, they suggest that an appropriate 
allocation of support to business R&D may mitigate the negative effect that recessions have on 
highly cyclical R&D investments through the reallocation of human capital to R&D activities, 
even if other innovation activities –monetary investment in particular– are reduced.  One 
limitation of our study is that we can only obtain very tentative results for large firms, because 
of the lack of a large enough control group of non-supported firms for each treatment pattern. 
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A second limitation is that the database, PITEC, does not provide information on two important 
issues: whether a firm applied for support but was rejected, and whether the firm uses tax 
incentives to R&D. Since Spain is among the countries that provide R&D tax credits, the 
estimated effects of direct support may partly capture the effects of tax credits. However, given 
that in practice mostly large firms benefit from tax credits, we expect our results for SMEs not 
to be too biased.   
Allowing for the necessary prudence in interpreting the policy implications of our findings, our 
results bring about some thoughts about public support to business R&D and innovation 
activities. As the OECD database on R&D tax incentives shows, many countries have increased 
their reliance on this instrument relative to direct support (Appelt et al. 2019). Yet, the evidence 
on the comparative effectiveness of each form of support is scarce and controversial, in part 
because the design of tax incentives varies across countries, with different provisions for firm 
size and loss and tax liability status.30 The performance of R&D tax incentives over the 
business cycle has not been studied, but it is likely that they are highly procyclical, to the extent 
that many firm’s profits are. Work by Edgerton (2010) suggests that during recessions, when 
cash flows are low, tax incentives in general have the smallest impact on investment. This may 
well carry over to R&D tax incentives. Thus, if these hypotheses were to be confirmed, our 
results regarding the effectiveness of direct support during recessions provide an additional 
argument in favor of the use of this instrument.  
A set of related issues remain to be explored regarding the effects of direct support. One of 
them is to focus specifically on treatment duration –spell length- and its effects on innovation 
outcomes such as the introduction of innovations that are new to the firm and of innovations 
that are new to the market, on the probability of starting and stopping of innovation projects, 
                                                          
30
 See Appelt et al. (2019) for aggregate level comparative evidence, and Alvarez-Ayuso et al. (2019) for firm-
level evidence for Spain. 
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and on the type of projects undertaken. A better understanding of these effects and comparing 
them with those of R&D tax incentives may contribute to improving the efficiency of the policy 
mix. 
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Tables and Figures. 
Table 1. Evolution of Innovation expenditures and direct support. SMEs. 
Year 
Firms with 
innovation 
expenditures 
Firms 
doing R&D 
% doing 
RD of 
firms with 
innovation  
% receiving 
public 
funding*  
% receiving 
public 
funding** 
Mean Public 
funding/R&D 
*** 
2005 3,030 2,741 90.46 31.82 35.17 39.92 
2006 2,901 2,537 87.45 31.13 35.59 35.44 
2007 2,783 2,453 88.14 31.26 35.47 37.39 
2008 2,702 2,387 88.34 32.16 36.41 37.51 
2009 2,685 2,309 86.00 33.45 38.89 37.82 
2010 2,612 2,232 85.45 31.28 36.60 36.40 
2011 2,638 2,229 84.50 28.54 33.78 34.73 
2012 2,515 2,169 86.24 25.57 29.65 32.21 
2013 2,391 2,088 87.33 25.05 28.69 29.44 
2014 2,239 1,968 87.90 24.39 27.74 31.07 
Notes: *If innovation expenditures are positive; **if research and development expenditures (R&D) 
are positive. *** if the subsidy is positive. Sample: 3,362 SMEs that remain in the panel for 10 years 
and invested in innovation at least once during the period under study. 
 
Table 2. Frequency of participation over the years. SMEs 
  Number of Firms Percent 
1 year 434 23.54% 
2 years 300 16.27% 
3 years 209 11.33% 
4 years 172 9.33% 
5 years  128 6.94% 
6 years 126 6.83% 
7 years 104 5.64% 
8 years 109 5.91% 
9 years 103 5.59% 
10 years 159 8.62% 
Total recipients 1,844 100.00% 
Sample: Firms that stay for ten years in the panel and invest in innovation at least one year during the 
period. 
Table 3. Transition probabilities of public support and of innovation effort. SMEs 
Status at t-1 
Funding status at t Innovation Status at t 
No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) 
No (%) 92.6   7. 3 72.4 27.5 
Yes (%) 29.1 70.9 10.3 89.6 
Note: The sample includes firms that invest in innovation at least one year during the period in the 
balanced panel. Percentages are very similar when using the unbalanced panel.  
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Table 4. Participation. Dynamic Probit estimation. Marginal Effects. SMEs 
Variables 
Period 1: 2005-2008 Period 2: 2009 - 2012 Period 3: 2013 – 2015a 
Wooldridge 
 
(1) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (2) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(3) 
Wooldridge 
 
(4) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (5) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(6) 
Wooldridge 
 
 (7) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (8) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(9) 
          
Public support (t-1) 0.120*** 0.173*** 0.296*** 0.231*** 0.237*** 0.268*** 0.212*** 0.206*** 0.225*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Public support (t0) 0.125*** 0.102***  0.102*** 0.067***  0.050*** 0.048***  
 (0.011) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006)  
Sales growth (t-1) 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
External funding (t-1) 0.017** 0.0214** 0.019** 0.008 -0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.005 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Demand Uncertainty (t-1) 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Continuous R&D performer 0.108*** 0.064*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.067*** 0.109*** 0.095*** 0.054*** 0.095*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
R&D employees (t-1) 0.076*** 0.0285 0.081** 0.052** 0.010 0.052* 0.012 -0.017 0.022 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Higher education (t-1) 0.077*** 0.0416** 0.088*** 0.037*** 0.020* 0.052*** 0.036*** 0.024** 0.048*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
IP protect (t-1) -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cooperation (t-1) 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.071*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.057*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size. x≤20 (t-1) -0.034*** -0.051*** -0.035** -0.029*** -0.041*** -0.026** -0.019* -0.020** -0.019 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Size 20<x≤50 (t-1) -0.016 -0.026* -0.014 -0.013 -0.022** -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size 50<x≤100 (t-1) -0.009 -0.010 -0.006 0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Group membership (t-1) -0.004 -0.010 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Foreign ownership (t-1) -0.031* -0.036** -0.040** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.059*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.044*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Export (t-1) 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
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Variables 
Period 1: 2005-2008 Period 2: 2009 - 2012 Period 3: 2013 – 2015a 
Wooldridge 
 
(1) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (2) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(3) 
Wooldridge 
 
(4) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (5) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(6) 
Wooldridge 
 
 (7) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (8) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(9) 
          
Young 0.014* 0.011 0.017 0.009 0.008 0.013 -0.041 -0.043 -0.046 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
High tech Manufac. -0.012 -0.029 -0.015 -0.007 -0.021* -0.006 -0.010 -0.019 -0.009 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Medium tech Manufac 0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.011 -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
High-tech services 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.030*** 0.021** 0.032** 0.002 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Rest Services -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
UE support (t-1) 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.084*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.046*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Innovation intensity (t-1) 0.006*** -0.013*** 0.006** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.003* 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M_Innovation intensity  0.043***   0.031***   0.021***  
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)  
M_External funding (t-1)  -0.011   0.016   -0.010  
  (0.013)   (0.010)   (0.010)  
M_Demand Uncertainty (t-1)  0.001   0.001   -0.001  
  (0.013)   (0.011)   (0.011)  
Log likelihood -3261.115 -3112.0599 -3321.7829 -3861.909 -3720.6206 -3943.527 -2302.0221 -2225.6514 -2339.3505 
lnsig2u -0.678*** -1.559***  -3.092*** -11.788  -13.119 -12.92  
 (0.189) (0.368)  (0.820) (9.624)  (12.773) (9.820)  
Sigma_u 0.712*** 0.458***  0.213*** 0.003  0.001 0.002  
 (0.067) (0.084)  (0.087) (0.013)     (0.009) (0.008)  
rho 0.336*** 0.174***  0.043 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 (0.042) (0.053)  (0.034) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Wald Chi2 1854.72*** 2172.49*** 3141.75*** 3911.87*** 4060.95*** 4284.65*** 2731.33*** 2600.35*** 2339.35*** 
N 9,620 9,620 9,620 12,826 12,826 12,826 9,616 9,616 9,616 
Firms 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 
Notes: Marginal effects at the average value; Standard errors calculated using delta method (in parentheses). In columns (1) and (2) the integration method is mvaghermite using eight quadrature 
points; Time dummies included in all specifications. M_ denotes the within mean of the corresponding variable, from year 1 to year T. Initial values differ for each period. Reference category for 
size is 100<x≤200. aNote that 2015 has been included to carry out the estimation of this period. The accuracy of the results has been checked using 12 and 16 quadrature points.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5. Within-period estimated average probability of being supported in period t, 
given participation in t-1 
 
Estimated magnitude of state 
dependence 
Period 1: 2005-2008 0.256 
Period 2: 2009-2013 0.374 
Period 3: 2014-2015 0.368 
Note: Based on the results given in Table 4, columns 2, 5 and 8. 
Table 6. Treatment patterns. SMEs 
Treatment 
pattern  Treatment Condition 
Number of 
treated Firms 
Number 
of 
Controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Expansion 
1 Participated one year between 2006 and 2008 but 
not in 2005 nor after 2008.  
119 1,512 
2 Participated two years between 2006 and 2008 but 
not in 2005 nor after 2008. 
40 1,512 
Recession 
3 
 
Participated one year between 2009 and 2013 but 
not before 2009 nor after 2013. 
 
117 1,512 
4 Participated two years between 2009 and 2013 but 
not before 2009 nor after 2013. 
62 1,512 
Note: The sample includes firms that invest in innovation at least one year during the period in the 
balanced panel for the period 2005-2014. Note that treated firms in this table are not the same as those 
in Table 2, because firms that had received funding in 2005 were dropped.  
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Table 7. Difference in covariates before and after matching (t-statistic). SMEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  UM= Unmatched sample; M=Matched sample; ª none of the treated firms received EU support in 2005; Innovation intensity in logs; significance levels:  * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; LR Chi2: Joint significance test. Note that all these covariates are used in the dynamic probit estimation shown in Table 4. 
 Treatment pattern 
(1) Expansion 
1 year 
(2) Expansion 
2 years 
(3) Recession 
1 year 
(4) Recession 
2 years 
Treated 
(N=119) 
Control 
(N=1512) Treated (N=40) 
Control 
(N=1512) Treated (N=117) 
Control 
(N=1512) Treated (N=62) 
Control 
(N=1512) 
UM M UM M UM M UM M 
Sales growth 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.68 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.44 
O. External funding 0.33 0.25* 0.39 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.19 
O. Demand Uncertainty 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.23 
Continuous R&D performer 0.61 0.49** 0.58 0.75 0.49*** 0.73 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.45 0.43 0.37 
R&D employees 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 
Higher education 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.35 0.23*** 0.38 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.30 
IP protect 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.43 0.32 0.25 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.18 
Cooperation 0.32 0.22** 0.27 0.33 0.22 0.40 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.17 0.21 
Size. x≤20 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.33 0.27 0.38 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.27 0.25 0.32 
Size 20<x≤50 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.39 
Size 50<x≤100 0.29 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.24* 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.11 
Group membership 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.28* 0.15 
Foreign Ownership 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.02 
Export 0.77 0.71 0.86 0.65 0.71 0.70 0.79 0.71** 0.86 0.73 0.71 0.61 
young 0.23 0.17* 0.24 0.38 0.17*** 0.40 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.19 
High tech Manufac. 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.04** 0.06 
Medium tech Manufac. 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.35 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.35 0.27 0.32 
High-tech services 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08 
Other Services 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.24 
UE support 0.03 0.01* 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Innovation intensity 7.36 6.83* 6.85 7.51 6.83 7.49 6.25 5.91 6.73 5.47 5.91 5.40 
Mean Bias  9.7 8.1  16.3 8.6  7.3 7.0  11.8 10.1 
LR Chi2  27.90 11.89  40.72*** 9.97  17.64 13.05  22.46 8.66 
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Table 8. Treatment patterns. Large Firms 
Treatment 
pattern  Treatment Condition 
Number of 
treated 
Firms 
Number 
of 
Controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Expansion 
1 Participated only one year between 2006 and 
2008 but neither in 2005 nor after 2008.  
35 704 
2 Participated only two years between 2006 and 
2008 but neither in 2005 nor after 2008. 
8 704 
Recession 
3 
 
Participated only one year between 2009 and 
2012 but neither before 2009 nor after 2013. 
35 704 
4 Participated only two years between 2009 and 
2012 but neither before 2009 nor after 2013. 
20 704 
 
 
Figure 1: Real growth rates of GDP and R&D investment 
 Spain 2005-2017  
 
Notes: GDP_G is rate of growth of GDP; BERD_G is rate of growth of R&D performed in the business sector; 
BFB_G is the growth rate of business-financed BERD; GFB/BERD is the percentage of BERD financed by 
government. Data sources: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators and OECD Economic Outlook 2019 
for GDP growth. The OECD reports a time-series break in 2008 for BERD: beginning in 2008, the R&D 
questionnaire includes a specific category for on-site consultants undertaking R&D projects in the enterprise; as 
well as a specific category within the breakdown of current costs. 
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Figure 2. Estimated Average Treatment Effects on the treated. SMEs 
By estimation method and treatment pattern  
Outcome: R&D employees in FTE 
Panel A: One-year participants  
 
Panel B: Two-year participants 
 
Notes: The vertical axis measures the difference in average number of full-time equivalent employees dedicated 
to R&D activities. Treatment patterns are as described in Table 4, and estimates are reported in Table A1.4.   
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Expansion (Pattern 1) 
DID DID + Controls
DID weighted DID Matched
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Recession (Pattern 3)
DID DID + Controls
DID weighted DID Matched
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Expansion (Pattern 2)
DID DID + Controls
DID weighted DID Matched
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Recession (Pattern 4)
DID DID + Controls
DID weighted DID Matched
45 
 
Figure 3. Estimated treatment effects before and during the crisis. SMEs 
A) Expansion 
 
b) Recession 
 
Notes: Graph shows point estimates and capped spikes show confidence intervals from tables A1.3 (investment 
per employee) and A1.4 (R&D personnel in FTE) (column 4: DiD+Matching). 
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Appendix 1.  
Table A1.1 Variable definition 
Variables Definition 
Public support  Binary indicator of participating in public support programs from the Central or 
regional administrations.  
Innovation Intensity Log of innovation investment per employee in constant prices  
R&D employees in FTE  Number of R&D employees (researchers, technicians and auxiliary staff) in Full 
Time Equivalent (FTE).  
Continuous R&D performer Binary; firm engages in R&D activities on a continuous basis.  
Sales growth  Real growth rate of sales calculated as (Ln (sales) t - ln (sales) t - 1). Sales have 
been deflated with the GDP deflator, at 2010 prices. 
O. External funding  Binary: Firm declares that access to external funding is an important obstacle for 
innovating  
O. Demand Uncertainty  Binary; Firm declares that demand uncertainty is an important obstacle for 
innovating  
IP protect  Binary; Firm uses formal IP mechanisms  
Cooperation Binary; firm reports active cooperation for innovation activities with other firms 
or institutions.  
Higher education  The share of employees with higher education 
R&D employees Percentage of R&D employees over the total workforce of the firm. 
Group membership Binary; Firm belongs to a business group. 
Foreign ownership Binary; for multinational firms with participation of foreign capital greater than 
50% 
Export  Binary; Firm has sold products and/or services in the international market 
(European and third party). 
Size. x≤20 Binary; Firm Size x≤20 employees 
Size 20<x≤50 Binary; Firm Size 20<x≤50 employees 
Size 50<x≤100 Binary; Firm Size 50<x≤100 employees 
Size 100<x≤200 Binary; Firm Size 100<x≤200 employees 
Size 200<x≤400 Binary; Firm Size 200<x≤400 employees 
Size 400<x≤700 Binary; Firm Size 400<x≤700 employees 
Size >700 Binary; Firm Size x>700 employees 
Young  Firm is young (age is < 19 years) 
High tech Manufac. Binary; firm belongs to the Manufacturing sectors:  pharmacy, IT products, 
electronic and optical products, aeronautical and space industries  
Medium Tech Manufac Binary; firm belongs to the Manufacturing sectors:  chemicals, mechanical and 
electrical equipment, other machinery, motor vehicles, naval construction. 
Other Manufacturing Binary; firm belongs to remaining manufacturing sectors: food, beverages and 
tobacco, textiles, clothing, leather and footwear, wood and cork, cardboard and 
paper, rubber and plastics, metal manufactures, other transport equipment, 
furniture, other manufacturing activities, graphic arts. 
High Tech Services Binary; firm belongs to the High Technology Services sectors: 
telecommunications, programming, consulting and other information activities, 
other information and communications services, R&D services. 
Other Services Binary; firm belongs to other Services sectors: repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment, commerce, transportation and storage, hotels and 
accommodation, financial and insurance activities, real estate activities, 
administrative activities and auxiliary services, education, sanitary activities and 
social services, artistic, recreational and entertainment activities, other services. 
EU support Binary indicator of participating in public support programs from the European 
Union. 
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Table A1.2. Summary Statistics 
 (1) Expansion 
1 year 
N=119 
(2) Expansion 
2 years 
N=40 
(3) Recession 
1 year 
N=117 
(4) Recession 
2 years 
N=62 
VARIABLES mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
         
Sales growth -0.0193 0.301 -0.0207 0.366 -0.00202 0.305 -0.0248 0.270 
O. External funding 0.334 0.472 0.333 0.472 0.380 0.486 0.295 0.456 
O. Demand Uncertainty 0.239 0.427 0.228 0.420 0.287 0.453 0.239 0.427 
Continuous R&D performer 0.534 0.499 0.500 0.501 0.513 0.500 0.527 0.500 
R&D employees 0.0368 0.0762 0.0441 0.0792 0.0342 0.0731 0.0490 0.0954 
Higher education 0.269 0.240 0.354 0.276 0.276 0.256 0.267 0.234 
IP protect 0.294 0.456 0.307 0.462 0.294 0.456 0.287 0.453 
Cooperation 0.291 0.454 0.330 0.471 0.305 0.461 0.376 0.485 
Size. x≤20 0.283 0.451 0.287 0.453 0.242 0.428 0.311 0.463 
Size 20<x≤50 0.319 0.466 0.395 0.489 0.338 0.473 0.335 0.473 
Size 50<x≤100 0.260 0.439 0.263 0.441 0.283 0.451 0.234 0.424 
Group membership 0.290 0.454 0.390 0.488 0.298 0.458 0.235 0.425 
Foreign Ownership 0.0647 0.246 0.163 0.369 0.0726 0.260 0.0548 0.228 
Export 0.788 0.409 0.703 0.458 0.794 0.405 0.745 0.436 
young 0.105 0.307 0.220 0.415 0.0744 0.262 0.0968 0.296 
High tech Manufac. 0.0765 0.266 0.0900 0.287 0.0521 0.222 0.0952 0.294 
Medium tech Manufac. 0.281 0.450 0.338 0.473 0.253 0.435 0.348 0.477 
High-tech services 0.100 0.300 0.100 0.300 0.0940 0.292 0.0726 0.260 
Other Services 0.139 0.346 0.172 0.378 0.185 0.389 0.179 0.384 
UE support 0.0143 0.119 0.0275 0.164 0.0197 0.139 0.0081 0.0895 
Innovation intensity 6.783 3.409 6.906 3.643 6.372 3.583 6.828 3.559 
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Table A1.3. SMEs. Treatment effects. Outcome: Ln(Total Innovation Investment per 
worker) 
 DiD DiD Controls DiD Weighted DiD Matching 
Treatment pattern 1: expansion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2006 0.311*** 0.440*** 0.250** 0.435*** 
 (0.101) (0.126) (0.122) (0.126) 
2007 0.192* 0.297** 0.231* 0.293** 
 (0.108) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) 
2008 0.158 0.259** 0.140 0.256** 
 (0.115) (0.123) (0.138) (0.123) 
2009 -0.036 0.086 -0.082 0.081 
 (0.092) (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) 
2010 -0.153 -0.032 -0.223** -0.039 
 (0.101) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
2011 -0.045 0.079 -0.011 0.076 
 (0.107) (0.097) (0.153) (0.098) 
2012 0.025 0.143 0.033 0.138 
 (0.099) (0.090) (0.134) (0.090) 
2013 -0.130 -0.019 -0.164 -0.020 
 (0.098) (0.080) (0.103) (0.080) 
Observations 16,310 14,677 16,310 14,461 
Treatment pattern 2: expansion     
2006 0.489*** 0.419** 0.635*** 0.378* 
 (0.133) (0.198) (0.167) (0.194) 
2007 0.418** 0.408* 0.506** 0.391* 
 (0.196) (0.224) (0.206) (0.219) 
2008 0.283** 0.354 0.227 0.322 
 (0.134) (0.267) (0.147) (0.264) 
2009 -0.142 0.008 -0.219 -0.021 
 (0.169) (0.251) (0.168) (0.249) 
2010 -0.235* -0.143 -0.286** -0.142 
 (0.139) (0.182) (0.138) (0.178) 
2011 -0.297** -0.194 -0.431*** -0.176 
 (0.133) (0.176) (0.161) (0.172) 
2012 -0.155 -0.055 -0.410* -0.066 
 (0.184) (0.179) (0.213) (0.179) 
2013 -0.216 -0.097 -0.217 -0.105 
 (0.180) (0.160) (0.139) (0.161) 
Observations 15,520 13,966 15,390 10,845 
Treatment pattern 3: recession      
2009 0.236*** 0.180** 0.223** 0.120 
 (0.085) (0.086) (0.100) (0.099) 
2010 0.187* 0.082 0.121 0.063 
 (0.100) (0.102) (0.119) (0.108) 
2011 0.276** 0.161 0.228** 0.144 
 (0.112) (0.110) (0.111) (0.127) 
2012 0.220** 0.092 0.190* 0.118 
 (0.109) (0.107) (0.109) (0.128) 
2013 0.031 -0.045 0.010 -0.002 
 (0.100) (0.097) (0.096) (0.114) 
2014 -0.093 -0.174* -0.117 -0.182 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.132) 
Observations 16,290 14,659 16,290 14,533 
Treatment pattern 4: recession     
2009 0.400*** 0.333*** 0.181 0.330*** 
 (0.133) (0.116) (0.138) (0.117) 
2010 0.482*** 0.372*** 0.243 0.363*** 
 (0.133) (0.120) (0.182) (0.121) 
2011 0.480*** 0.334** 0.362** 0.325** 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.155) (0.159) 
2012 0.372*** 0.181 0.247* 0.167 
 (0.142) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
2013 0.148 0.031 0.087 0.018 
 (0.143) (0.121) (0.145) (0.122) 
2014 0.101 -0.010 -0.043 -0.021 
 (0.136) (0.120) (0.132) (0.120) 
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 DiD DiD Controls DiD Weighted DiD Matching 
Treatment pattern 1: expansion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Observations 15,740 14,164 15,740 13,498 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Ln (1 + Total innovation expenditures). Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Controls include all covariates used in the propensity 
score estimates. 
 
 
Table A1.4 SMEs. Treatment effects. Outcome: Human Capital (R&D employees FTE) 
 DiD DiD + Controls DiD Weighted DiD Matching 
Treatment pattern 1: expansion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2006 0.232*** 0.177** 0.204*** 0.179** 
 (0.060) (0.073) (0.060) (0.073) 
2007 0.238*** 0.131* 0.214*** 0.131* 
 (0.067) (0.074) (0.061) (0.074) 
2008 0.259*** 0.144** 0.276*** 0.144** 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.076) (0.073) 
2009 0.050 -0.041 0.022 -0.042 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.076) (0.070) 
2010 0.015 -0.050 -0.018 -0.051 
 (0.064) (0.059) (0.057) (0.059) 
2011 0.118** 0.045 0.085 0.046 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
2012 0.125** 0.057 0.089 0.057 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.059) (0.055) 
2013 0.056 -0.015 0.023 -0.015 
 (0.054) (0.042) (0.054) (0.042) 
Observations 16,189 14,576 16,189 14,360 
Treatment pattern 2: expansion     
2006 0.315*** 0.192* 0.275** 0.181* 
 (0.099) (0.108) (0.112) (0.109) 
2007 0.479*** 0.423*** 0.597*** 0.409*** 
 (0.103) (0.112) (0.104) (0.113) 
2008 0.413*** 0.446*** 0.399*** 0.429** 
 (0.104) (0.166) (0.132) (0.167) 
2009 0.030 0.138 0.062 0.121 
 (0.091) (0.119) (0.111) (0.121) 
2010 -0.110 -0.042 -0.078 -0.051 
 (0.084) (0.079) (0.078) (0.081) 
2011 -0.054 0.018 -0.000 0.013 
 (0.077) (0.054) (0.083) (0.056) 
2012 0.116 0.133** 0.103 0.129* 
 (0.082) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) 
2013 0.010 0.051 0.004 0.044 
 (0.071) (0.048) (0.079) (0.049) 
Observations 15,410 13,874 15,287 10,770 
Treatment pattern 3: recession     
t2009 0.220*** 0.151*** 0.213*** 0.151*** 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.056) (0.047) 
2010 0.313*** 0.173*** 0.338*** 0.173*** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.067) (0.060) 
2011 0.306*** 0.142** 0.336*** 0.143** 
 (0.066) (0.057) (0.068) (0.057) 
2012 0.277*** 0.105* 0.324*** 0.106* 
 (0.067) (0.056) (0.069) (0.056) 
2013 0.170** 0.069 0.206*** 0.071 
 (0.071) (0.055) (0.072) (0.055) 
2014 0.120 0.033 0.145* 0.035 
 (0.078) (0.057) (0.081) (0.057) 
Observations 16,168 14,557 16,168 14,432 
Treatment pattern 4: recession     
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 DiD DiD + Controls DiD Weighted DiD Matching 
Treatment pattern 1: expansion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2009 0.296*** 0.211*** 0.166 0.209*** 
 (0.106) (0.076) (0.138) (0.076) 
2010 0.502*** 0.347*** 0.291** 0.341*** 
 (0.102) (0.075) (0.127) (0.076) 
2011 0.584*** 0.373*** 0.508*** 0.366*** 
 (0.094) (0.089) (0.108) (0.089) 
2012 0.448*** 0.199** 0.374*** 0.191** 
 (0.089) (0.081) (0.106) (0.081) 
2013 0.296*** 0.155* 0.207* 0.147* 
 (0.112) (0.086) (0.124) (0.087) 
2014 0.273*** 0.154** 0.124 0.148* 
 (0.102) (0.076) (0.117) (0.076) 
Observations 15,620 14,064 15,620 13,403 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Dependent Variable: R&D employees (FTE). Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Controls include all covariates used in the propensity score 
estimates
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Appendix 2: Large Firms 
 
Table A2.1. Large Firms. Innovation expenditures and public funding. 
 
Firms with 
innovation 
expenditures 
Firms doing 
R&D 
% doing RD 
over firms 
with innov. 
expenditures 
% receiving 
public 
funding*  
% receiving 
public 
funding** 
Mean Public 
funding/R&D 
ratio*** 
2005 771 575 74.58 26.33 35.30 25.62 
2006 780 577 73.97 30.13 40.73 25.36 
2007 797 587 73.65 28.98 39.35 24.67 
2008 816 601 73.65 30.76 41.76 27.93 
2009 838 602 71.84 29.83 41.53 27.40 
2010 809 596 73.67 29.91 40.60 25.59 
2011 811 589 72.63 29.35 40.41 21.95 
2012 799 586 73.34 25.53 34.81 19.42 
2013 782 593 75.83 24.04 31.70 19.02 
2014 774 589 76.10 24.68 32.43 17.03 
Notes: *If innovation expenditures are positive; **if research and development expenditures (R&D) are 
positive. *** if the subsidy is positive. Sample: Balanced panel of 1,169 firms that remain in the panel for 
10 years and that invested in innovation at least once in the period under study. 
 
 
Table A2.2. Large firms. Frequency of participation over the years.  
 Number of firms Percent 
1 year 98 21.1% 
2 years 70 15.1% 
3 years 39 8.4% 
4 years 42 9.0% 
5 years 31 6.7% 
6 years 24 5.2% 
7 years 36 7.7% 
8 years 34 7.3% 
9 years 23 4.9% 
10 years 68 14.6% 
Cumulated Sum of recipients 465 100.0% 
 
 
Table A2.3: Large firms. Transition probabilities of public funding and innovation  
Status at t-1 
Funding status at t Innovation Status at t 
No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) 
All firms 
No (%) 94.48 5.52 76.85 23.15 
Yes (%) 23.77 76.23 10.55 89.45 
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Table A2.4 Large firms. Dynamic probit participation  
(Marginal Effects) 
Variables 
Period 1: 2005-2008 Period 2: 2009 - 2012 Period 3: 2013 - 2015 
Wooldridge 
 
(1) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (2) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(3) 
Wooldridge 
 
(4) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (5) 
Pooled Probit 
 
(6) 
Wooldridge 
 
 (7) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (8) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(9) 
          
Public support (t-1) 0.105*** 0.139*** 0.224*** 0.186*** 0.193*** 0.215*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.198*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Public support (t0) 0.084*** 0.073***  0.073*** 0.054***  0.032*** 0.029***  
 (0.017) (0.020)  (0.020) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009)  
Sales growth  -0.030** -0.035** -0.037* 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.009 0.007 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) 
External funding (t-1) 0.005 -0.009 0.006 -0.010 -0.029** -0.009 0.010 0.002 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) 
Demand Uncertainty (t-1) 0.028** 0.013 0.033** 0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.013 0.029** 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) 
Continuous R&D performer 0.118*** 0.102*** 0.133*** 0.115*** 0.092*** 0.121*** 0.083*** 0.062*** 0.0866*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
R&D employees (t-1) 0.226* 0.155 0.238 0.235** 0.134 0.295** 0.135 0.081 0.169* 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.133) (0.119) (0.107) (0.111) (0.098) (0.097) (0.081) 
Higher education (t-1) -0.032 -0.048** -0.027 0.030 0.016 0.036 0.027 0.014 0.032 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) 
IP protect (t-1) 0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Cooperation (t-1) 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.017* 0.017* 0.0191* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size 400<x≤700 (t-1) -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.027** -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Size x>700 (t-1) 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.020** -0.020** -0.021* 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Group (t-1) -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Foreign (t-1) -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.041*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.060*** -0.023** -0.021** -0.0268** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Export (t-1) 0.040 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.013 0.008 0.016 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
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Variables 
Period 1: 2005-2008 Period 2: 2009 - 2012 Period 3: 2013 - 2015 
Wooldridge 
 
(1) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (2) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(3) 
Wooldridge 
 
(4) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (5) 
Pooled Probit 
 
(6) 
Wooldridge 
 
 (7) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (8) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(9) 
          
Young 0.026* 0.028* 0.026 0.017 0.009 0.015 0.022 0.020 0.026 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.037) (0.035) (0.044) 
High tech Manufac. 0.010 0.000 0.013 -0.032** -0.044*** -0.029 -0.037** -0.039** -0.0355* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Medium tech Manufac 0.010 0.006 0.012 -0.003 -0.009 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
High-tech services 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.066** 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.020 0.026 0.019 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Rest Services 0.011 0.023* 0.010 -0.027** -0.013 -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.0388** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
UE support (t-1) 0.034** 0.030* 0.053** 0.041*** 0.031** 0.051*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.0405*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Innovation intensity (t-1) 0.001 -0.011*** 0.000 0.001 -0.011*** 0.001 0.000 -0.010*** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
M_Innovation intensity  0.022***   0.022***   0.016***  
  (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.003)  
M_External funding (t-1)  0.035*   0.028*   0.016  
  (0.021)   (0.016)   (0.017)  
M_Demand Uncertainty (t-1)  0.018   0.011   -0.023  
  (0.021)   (0.017)   (0.017)  
Log likelihood -776.87498 -755.82733 -787.9956 -985.79 -962.970 -1005.179 -605.77603 -592.19561 -611.86529 
lnsig2u -0.841 -1.605  -3.126 -10.354  -13.950 -15.271  
 (0.477) (0.869)  (1.732) (12.358)  (23.718) (149.26)  
Sigma_u 0.657*** 0.448  0.209* 0.006  0.001 0.000  
 (0.157) (0.194)  (0.181) (0.035)  (0.011) (0.036)  
rho 0.301*** 0.167  0.042* 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 (0.100) (0.121)  (0.070) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Wald Chi2 548.18*** 628.15*** 1089.21*** 1261.53*** 1554.90*** 1465.33*** 972.01*** 932.21*** 1031.71*** 
N 
Firms 
3,402 
1,134 
3,402 
1,134 
3,402 
1,134 
4,536 
1,134 
4,536 
1,134 
4,536 
1,134 
3,402 
1,134 
3,402 
1,134 
3,402 
1,134 
Notes: As Table 4. Reference category for size is 200<x≤400 
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Table A2.5: Large firms. Difference-in-difference estimations.  
Outcome: Ln(Total Innovation Investment per worker)  
 DiD DiD + Controls DiD (Weighted) DiD (Matching) 
Treatment pattern 1: Expansion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2006 -0.032 0.085 0.162 0.051 
 (0.198) (0.264) (0.288) (0.263) 
2007 0.156 0.284 0.180 0.293 
 (0.202) (0.268) (0.247) (0.268) 
2008 -0.002 0.130 -0.083 0.145 
 (0.225) (0.246) (0.255) (0.249) 
2009 0.010 0.159 -0.215 0.189 
 (0.204) (0.215) (0.211) (0.217) 
2010 0.166 0.213 0.104 0.253 
 (0.167) (0.222) (0.196) (0.224) 
2011 0.146 0.227 0.046 0.240 
 (0.173) (0.217) (0.174) (0.223) 
2012 -0.154 -0.028 -0.231 -0.039 
 (0.164) (0.172) (0.188) (0.178) 
2013 -0.119 -0.042 -0.153 -0.036 
 (0.166) (0.169) (0.173) (0.177) 
Observations 7,390 6,651 7,390 5,130 
Treatment pattern 3: Recession     
2009 0.400** 0.230 0.616** 0.264 
 (0.172) (0.160) (0.272) (0.166) 
2010 0.150 -0.029 0.024 -0.037 
 (0.229) (0.236) (0.510) (0.235) 
2011 0.350 0.181 0.165 0.177 
 (0.220) (0.242) (0.496) (0.241) 
2012 0.374** 0.203 -0.005 0.184 
 (0.185) (0.204) (0.438) (0.210) 
2013 0.309 0.152 0.403* 0.161 
 (0.196) (0.200) (0.207) (0.205) 
2014 -0.056 -0.199 -0.506 -0.223 
 (0.230) (0.246) (0.653) (0.247) 
Observations 7,390 6,651 7,390 4,716 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Notes: As table A1.3 
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Table A2.6: Large firms. Difference-in-difference estimations. 
Outcome: R&D employees FTE 
 DiD DiD + Controls DiD (Weighted) DiD (Matching) 
Treatment pattern 1: 
expansion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
treat2006 0.233 0.217 0.253 0.211 
 (0.153) (0.149) (0.214) (0.150) 
treat2007 0.189 0.115 0.135 0.124 
 (0.141) (0.128) (0.185) (0.128) 
treat2008 0.398*** 0.308** 0.472** 0.289** 
 (0.123) (0.142) (0.195) (0.142) 
treat2009 0.087 0.094 0.042 0.084 
 (0.130) (0.120) (0.157) (0.120) 
treat2010 0.189 0.123 0.170 0.117 
 (0.125) (0.100) (0.137) (0.100) 
treat2011 0.064 0.076 0.030 0.057 
 (0.118) (0.093) (0.118) (0.092) 
treat2012 0.029 0.081 0.009 0.066 
 (0.106) (0.101) (0.136) (0.101) 
treat2013 -0.010 -0.043 -0.070 -0.062 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.119) (0.100) 
Observations 7,358 6,621 7,358 5,100 
Treatment pattern 3: recession     
treat2009 0.595*** 0.257 0.757 0.245 
 (0.171) (0.176) (0.487) (0.178) 
treat2010 0.515*** 0.044 0.710* 0.034 
 (0.177) (0.133) (0.420) (0.133) 
treat2011 0.418*** 0.005 0.444 -0.003 
 (0.155) (0.157) (0.362) (0.158) 
treat2012 0.344* -0.033 0.379 -0.044 
 (0.194) (0.155) (0.391) (0.157) 
treat2013 0.056 -0.245 0.027 -0.262 
 (0.207) (0.188) (0.530) (0.189) 
treat2014 0.026 -0.286 0.107 -0.310 
 (0.234) (0.213) (0.512) (0.214) 
Observations 7,365 6,628 7,365 4,695 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Notes: As table A1.4 
  
56 
 
Supplementary Materials 
 
Table S1. SMEs. Propensity Score Estimates. 
 Treatment patterns 
 (1) Expansion 
 1 year 
(2) Expansion 
 2 years 
(3) Recession 
1 year 
(4) Recession 
2 years 
Sales growth (t-1) -0.073 0.067 0.028 -0.079 
 (0.099) (0.156) (0.098) (0.125) 
O. External funding (t-1) 0.160 -0.151 0.068 -0.089 
 (0.106) (0.175) (0.110) (0.145) 
O. Demand Uncertainty (t-1) 0.011 0.133 0.069 0.039 
 (0.123) (0.176) (0.120) (0.148) 
Continuous R&D performer (t-1) 0.153 0.545*** -0.084 0.037 
 (0.108) (0.185) (0.113) (0.146) 
IP protect (t-1) 0.011 -0.038 0.136 0.022 
 (0.102) (0.157) (0.108) (0.140) 
R&D employees (t-1) -0.400 -0.411 -0.047 0.606 
 (0.732) (1.212) (0.683) (0.778) 
Higher education (t-1) 0.118 1.022*** 0.328 0.430 
 (0.264) (0.392) (0.254) (0.314) 
Cooperation (t-1) 0.246** 0.182 0.058 0.269* 
 (0.108) (0.164) (0.125) (0.155) 
Group membership (t-1) -0.216 0.057 -0.054 -0.344** 
 (0.134) (0.186) (0.124) (0.175) 
Foreign Ownership (t-1) -0.017 0.110 -0.242 -0.112 
 (0.193) (0.272) (0.197) (0.272) 
Export (t-1) 0.136 -0.208 0.231* 0.005 
 (0.127) (0.185) (0.125) (0.152) 
Size. x≤20 (t-1) 0.012 0.377 -0.127 -0.177 
 (0.186) (0.342) (0.176) (0.207) 
Size 20<x≤50 (t-1) 0.034 0.485 0.028 -0.125 
 (0.164) (0.314) (0.151) (0.185) 
Size 50<x≤100 (t-1) 0.145 0.515* 0.192 -0.213 
 (0.161) (0.313) (0.151) (0.196) 
Young (t-1) 0.248** 0.535*** 0.061 0.132 
 (0.126) (0.177) (0.153) (0.186) 
High tech Manufac. 0.176 0.084 0.026 0.473* 
 (0.214) (0.305) (0.235) (0.248) 
Medium tech Manufac. -0.051 0.063 -0.098 0.288* 
 (0.122) (0.184) (0.122) (0.150) 
High-tech services -0.048 -0.704** -0.008 -0.254 
 (0.205) (0.359) (0.214) (0.291) 
Other Services -0.150 -0.425 -0.019 -0.067 
 (0.160) (0.266) (0.152) (0.206) 
UE support (t-1) 0.640* ª 0.555 0.500 
 (0.385)  (0.462) (0.593) 
Innovation intensity (t-1) 0.009 -0.012 0.008 -0.040** 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.016) (0.020) 
Observations 1,631 1,539 1,629 1,574 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.04 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. ª none of the treated firms received EU 
support in 2005. The balancing property is satisfied in all estimations.  
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Table S2. Descriptive Statistics SMEs.  
Robustness: Balanced and unbalanced panel 
Variables 
2005-2008 2009-2012 2013-2015 
Balanced Unbalanced Balanced Unbalanced Balanced Unbalanced 
Public Support 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.14 
 (0.442) (0.429) (0.422) (0.386) (0.369) (0.350) 
Sales growth (log-dif) 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 0.01 -0.05 
 (0.265) (0.449) (0.290) (0.487) (0.292) (0.479) 
External funding 0.29 0.33 0.38 0.41 0.35 0.36 
 (0.455) (0.468) (0.486) (0.491) (0.475) (0.479) 
Demand Uncertainty 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.23 
 (0.415) (0.418) (0.449) (0.451) (0.425) (0.423) 
Continuous R&D 
performer 0.59 0.51 0.53 0.40 0.48 0.41 
 (0.492) (0.500) (0.499) (0.490) (0.500) (0.492) 
R&D employees 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.137) (0.147) (0.141) (0.158) (0.146) (0.143) 
Higher education 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.34 
 (0.287) (0.301) (0.286) (0.301) (0.291) (0.304) 
IP protect 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.18 
 (0.469) (0.460) (0.444) (0.419) (0.403) (0.388) 
Cooperation 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.29 
 (0.474) (0.462) (0.471) (0.448) (0.466) (0.454) 
Size. x≤20 0.29 0.36 0.30 0.38 0.31 0.34 
 (0.453) (0.481) (0.456) (0.486) (0.463) (0.475) 
Size 20<x≤50 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.28 
 (0.472) (0.461) (0.472) (0.454) (0.465) (0.447) 
Size 50<x≤100 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.18 0.25 0.21 
 (0.424) (0.391) (0.425) (0.380) (0.431) (0.407) 
Group  0.27 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.36 
 (0.443) (0.441) (0.461) (0.463) (0.472) (0.481) 
Foreign  0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 
 (0.257) (0.245) (0.274) (0.271) (0.284) (0.294) 
Export  0.71 0.63 0.75 0.67 0.78 0.74 
 (0.454) (0.482) (0.435) (0.469) (0.412) (0.437) 
Young 0.22 0.25 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.01 
 (0.417) (0.432) (0.277) (0.306) (0.0936) (0.118) 
High tech Manufac. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
 (0.222) (0.220) (0.226) (0.216) (0.230) (0.222) 
Medium tech Manufac. 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.22 
 (0.432) (0.407) (0.434) (0.410) (0.433) (0.417) 
High-tech services 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
 (0.354) (0.362) (0.350) (0.351) (0.347) (0.347) 
Rest Services 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.25 
 (0.403) (0.428) (0.404) (0.434) (0.406) (0.435) 
UE support 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 
 (0.189) (0.178) (0.206) (0.187) (0.230) (0.220) 
Innovation intensity (log) 7.28 6.78 6.66 5.20 5.78 5.03 
 (3.320) (3.725) (3.757) (4.341) (4.150) (4.349) 
N 12,828 27,808 12,828 25,080 9,621 14,286 
Notes: mean coefficients; sd in parentheses. 
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Table S3.  SMEs. Participation. Dynamic Probit estimation. Robustness: Unbalanced Panel 
(Marginal Effects)  
Variables 
Period 1: 2005-2008 Period 2: 2009 - 2012 Period 3: 2013 - 2015 
Wooldridge 
 
(1) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (2) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(3) 
Wooldridge 
 
(4) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (5) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(6) 
Wooldridge 
 
 (7) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (8) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(9) 
          
Public support (t-1) 0.125*** 0.186*** 0.273*** 0.179*** 0.188*** 0.214*** 0.189*** 0.183*** 0.201*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Public support (t0) 0.105*** 0.079***  0.056*** 0.049***  0.045*** 0.042***  
 (0.008) (0.009)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004)  
Sales growth  0.013** 0.012** 0.018** 0.011*** 0.006 0.012** 0.015** 0.011 0.013* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
External funding (t-1) 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Demand Uncertainty (t-1) 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Continuous R&D performer 0.117*** 0.069*** 0.127*** 0.099*** 0.054*** 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.047*** 0.086*** 
 (0.005 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
R&D employees (t-1) 0.053* 0.020 0.055** 0.030** -0.004 0.029* 0.004 -0.017 0.009 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) 
Higher education (t-1) 0.077*** 0.049*** 0.088*** 0.032*** 0.017** 0.041*** 0.022*** 0.011 0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
IP protect (t-1) -0.005 -0.008* -0.005 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cooperation (t-1) 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.056*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Size. x≤20 -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.022** -0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Size 20<x≤50 -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.022** -0.014** -0.015*** -0.013* -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Size 50<x≤100 -0.016** -0.016** -0.015 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Group (t-1) -0.009 -0.012** -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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Variables 
Period 1: 2005-2008 Period 2: 2009 - 2012 Period 3: 2013 - 2015 
Wooldridge 
 
(1) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (2) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(3) 
Wooldridge 
 
(4) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (5) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(6) 
Wooldridge 
 
 (7) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (8) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(9) 
          
Foreign (t-1) -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.036*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Export (t-1) 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0. 005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Young 0.014*** 0.012** 0.015** 0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
High tech Manufac. -0.003 -0.017* -0.007 -0.007 -0.019** -0.006 -0.011 -0.020** -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Medium tech Manufac 0.006 -0.003 0.004 -0.006 -0.013*** -0.007 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
High-tech services 0.011 0.004 0.011 0.017*** 0.010 0.018** 0.005 0.002 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Rest Services -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
UE support (t-1) 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.048*** 0.066*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.040*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Innovation intensity (t-1) 0.004*** -0.011*** 0.004** 0.004*** -0.007*** 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.008*** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M_Innovation intensity  0.034***   0.024***   0.020***  
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
M_External funding (t-1)  0.002   0.013**   -0.002  
  (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.008)  
M_Demand Uncertainty (t-1)  -0.004   0.002   0.008  
  (0.009)   (0.007)   (0.008)  
Log likelihood -6221.4082 -5880.8615 -6315.5845 -5801.858 -5499.1382 -5910.9731 -2920.0129 -2800.295 -2969.7722 
lnsig2u -0.860*** -2.273***  -2.642*** -12.247  -13.993 -12.878  
 (0.151) (0.470)  (0.419) (8.663)  (11.468) (7.774)  
Sigma_u 0.651*** 0.321***  0.270*** 0.002  0.001 0.001  
 (0.049) (0.075)  (0.056) (0.009)     (0.005) (0.006)  
rho 0.298*** 0.093***  0.066*** 0.000  0.000 0.000  
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Variables 
Period 1: 2005-2008 Period 2: 2009 - 2012 Period 3: 2013 - 2015 
Wooldridge 
 
(1) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (2) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(3) 
Wooldridge 
 
(4) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (5) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(6) 
Wooldridge 
 
 (7) 
Wooldridge  
-Mundlak 
 (8) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(9) 
          
 (0.032) (0.039)  (0.026) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Wald Chi2 3757.54*** 4580.80*** 6107.49*** 6204.96*** 6626.34*** 7383.77*** 3695.48*** 3450.44*** 3814.62*** 
N 19,913 19,912 19,913 24,007 24,007 12,826 13,756 13,756 13,756 
Firms 7,233 7,232 7,232 6,846 6,846 6,846 5,750 5,750 5,750 
Notes: As Table 4.  
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Table S4. SMEs. Treatment effects. Outcome:  Ln(Total Innovation Effort per worker). 
Robustness: Unbalanced Panel 
 DiD DiD + 
Controls 
DiD (Weighted) DiD (Matching) 
Treatment pattern 1: expansion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2006 0.302*** 0.418*** 0.179 0.434*** 
 (0.100) (0.123) (0.148) (0.124) 
2007 0.198* 0.267** 0.267* 0.273** 
 (0.104) (0.128) (0.160) (0.128) 
2008 0.134 0.233** 0.233 0.251** 
 (0.108) (0.119) (0.175) (0.121) 
2009 -0.022 0.084 -0.078 0.099 
 (0.085) (0.095) (0.104) (0.098) 
2010 -0.117 -0.028 -0.164 0.008 
 (0.098) (0.104) (0.114) (0.103) 
2011 0.011 0.115 0.027 0.109 
 (0.102) (0.094) (0.180) (0.097) 
2012 0.022 0.117 0.005 0.147* 
 (0.093) (0.085) (0.146) (0.087) 
2013 -0.090 0.001 -0.181 -0.012 
 (0.093) (0.075) (0.123) (0.077) 
Observations 33,753 28,621 30,811 26,403 
Treatment pattern 2: expansion     
2006 0.473*** 0.397** 0.526*** 0.403** 
 (0.129) (0.195) (0.179) (0.192) 
2007 0.434** 0.419* 0.525*** 0.419* 
 (0.191) (0.221) (0.186) (0.218) 
2008 0.288** 0.341 0.164 0.344 
 (0.131) (0.263) (0.156) (0.262) 
2009 -0.108 0.015 -0.221 0.022 
 (0.164) (0.247) (0.190) (0.247) 
2010 -0.180 -0.102 -0.302* -0.096 
 (0.134) (0.176) (0.166) (0.174) 
2011 -0.237* -0.138 -0.526*** -0.129 
 (0.131) (0.173) (0.198) (0.171) 
2012 -0.167 -0.078 -0.631** -0.071 
 (0.179) (0.174) (0.259) (0.175) 
2013 -0.170 -0.064 -0.305** -0.068 
 (0.176) (0.158) (0.149) (0.159) 
Observations 32,901 27,862 29,688 20,128 
Treatment pattern 3: recession     
2009 0.276*** 0.207** 0.245** 0.204** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.101) (0.081) 
2010 0.267*** 0.131 0.202* 0.126 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.116) (0.098) 
2011 0.345*** 0.207** 0.339*** 0.200* 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.121) (0.105) 
2012 0.226** 0.108 0.123 0.112 
 (0.105) (0.101) (0.137) (0.102) 
2013 0.064 0.003 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.093) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) 
2014 -0.073 -0.144 -0.058 -0.154 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.098) (0.101) 
Observations 33,751 28,617 29,048 26,219 
Treatment pattern 4: recession     
2009 0.426*** 0.354*** 0.161 0.344*** 
 (0.130) (0.114) (0.139) (0.114) 
2010 0.544*** 0.423*** 0.281 0.406*** 
 (0.129) (0.116) (0.173) (0.117) 
2011 0.523*** 0.391** 0.400** 0.370** 
 (0.155) (0.156) (0.164) (0.156) 
2012 0.379*** 0.199 0.275** 0.187 
 (0.139) (0.128) (0.139) (0.128) 
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 DiD DiD + 
Controls 
DiD (Weighted) DiD (Matching) 
2013 0.165 0.067 0.067 0.046 
 (0.140) (0.118) (0.143) (0.118) 
2014 0.114 0.022 -0.010 0.004 
 (0.133) (0.116) (0.135) (0.116) 
Observations 33121 28060 28418 23921 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Note: As Table A1.3 
 
Table S5. SMEs. Treatment effects. Outcome: Human Capital (R&D employees FTE) 
Robustness: Unbalanced Panel 
 DiD DiD + Controls DiD (Weighted) DiD 
(Matching) 
Treatment pattern 1: expansion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
treat2006 0.216*** 0.141** 0.190*** 0.155** 
 (0.057) (0.071) (0.060) (0.071) 
treat2007 0.244*** 0.093 0.249*** 0.103 
 (0.065) (0.073) (0.063) (0.073) 
treat2008 0.277*** 0.118* 0.391*** 0.139* 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.087) (0.072) 
treat2009 0.102 -0.047 0.114* -0.033 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) 
treat2010 0.072 -0.056 0.081 -0.043 
 (0.060) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) 
treat2011 0.197*** 0.046 0.195*** 0.051 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.061) (0.053) 
treat2012 0.188*** 0.044 0.201*** 0.063 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.072) (0.053) 
treat2013 0.118** -0.017 0.116** -0.006 
 (0.051) (0.040) (0.058) (0.041) 
Observations 33,549 28,474 30,618 26,261 
Treatment pattern 2: expansion     
treat2006 0.313*** 0.141 0.274** 0.140 
 (0.097) (0.104) (0.111) (0.105) 
treat2007 0.496*** 0.396*** 0.590*** 0.392*** 
 (0.101) (0.112) (0.098) (0.112) 
treat2008 0.470*** 0.452*** 0.416*** 0.450*** 
 (0.105) (0.167) (0.160) (0.168) 
treat2009 0.130 0.166 0.159 0.163 
 (0.095) (0.120) (0.117) (0.120) 
treat2010 -0.017 -0.034 0.029 -0.031 
 (0.084) (0.074) (0.088) (0.075) 
treat2011 0.060 0.043 0.125 0.043 
 (0.085) (0.053) (0.101) (0.055) 
treat2012 0.215** 0.129** 0.198** 0.135** 
 (0.085) (0.062) (0.087) (0.062) 
treat2013 0.118 0.071 0.117 0.073 
 (0.081) (0.048) (0.100) (0.049) 
Observations 32,709 27,724 29,516 20,021 
Treatment pattern 3: recession     
treat2009 0.288*** 0.180*** 0.256*** 0.179*** 
 (0.054) (0.048) (0.060) (0.048) 
treat2010 0.405*** 0.196*** 0.468*** 0.197*** 
 (0.061) (0.059) (0.082) (0.059) 
treat2011 0.418*** 0.166*** 0.518*** 0.169*** 
 (0.068) (0.056) (0.080) (0.056) 
treat2012 0.334*** 0.102* 0.391*** 0.104* 
 (0.069) (0.055) (0.072) (0.055) 
treat2013 0.204*** 0.072 0.221*** 0.069 
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 DiD DiD + Controls DiD (Weighted) DiD 
(Matching) 
 (0.070) (0.053) (0.070) (0.053) 
treat2014 0.154** 0.039 0.196** 0.034 
 (0.078) (0.058) (0.078) (0.058) 
Observations 33,545 28,468 28,876 26,088 
Treatment pattern 4: recession     
treat2009 0.385*** 0.247*** 0.265* 0.242*** 
 (0.105) (0.073) (0.138) (0.073) 
treat2010 0.600*** 0.385*** 0.434*** 0.378*** 
 (0.102) (0.075) (0.132) (0.075) 
treat2011 0.684*** 0.413*** 0.692*** 0.407*** 
 (0.094) (0.088) (0.114) (0.088) 
treat2012 0.527*** 0.221*** 0.531*** 0.214*** 
 (0.088) (0.079) (0.110) (0.079) 
treat2013 0.353*** 0.186** 0.319** 0.173** 
 (0.110) (0.085) (0.125) (0.085) 
treat2014 0.318*** 0.173** 0.224* 0.158** 
 (0.101) (0.075) (0.117) (0.075) 
Observations 32,919 27,914 28,250 23,795 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Note: As Table A1.4 
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Table S6. SMEs. Robustness: anticipation effects and placebo tests 
 
Treatment pattern 
Anticipation effects Placebo tests 
Total 
innovation 
Human K Sales Age Physical 
Investment 
Treatment pattern 1: 
expansion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2006   -0.012 0.003 0.138 
   (0.062) (0.021) (0.544) 
2007   0.000 0.007 0.422 
   (0.062) (0.016) (0.546) 
2008   0.012 0.005 0.110 
   (0.059) (0.013) (0.555) 
2009   0.034 0.008 0.340 
   (0.056) (0.010) (0.603) 
2010   0.014 -0.006 0.717 
   (0.051) (0.009) (0.479) 
2011   -0.003 -0.006 -0.223 
   (0.049) (0.007) (0.551) 
2012   0.028 -0.002 0.633 
   (0.043) (0.005) (0.509) 
2013   0.022 -0.002 -0.346 
   (0.026) (0.003) (0.537) 
Treatment pattern 2: 
expansion 
     
2006   0.073 -0.107 1.135 
   (0.212) (0.063) (1.051) 
2007   0.125 -0.059 1.238 
   (0.207) (0.036) (0.987) 
2008   0.198 -0.065 0.577 
   (0.213) (0.042) (1.324) 
2009   0.189 -0.037 0.313 
   (0.196) (0.026) (1.202) 
2010   0.135 -0.013 0.717 
   (0.172) (0.021) (1.053) 
2011   0.089 -0.018 0.727 
   (0.137) (0.017) (1.031) 
2012   0.082 0.000 0.328 
   (0.101) (0.014) (0.810) 
2013   0.084 -0.013 1.710 
   (0.068) (0.007) (0.999) 
Treatment pattern 3: 
recession 
     
2006 0.165 -0.062 -0.100 -0.003 -1.267 
 (0.120) (0.064) (0.068) (0.018) (0.793) 
2007 0.089 -0.000 -0.057 0.003 -0.761 
 (0.125) (0.061) (0.066) (0.013) (0.571) 
2008 0.261** -0.044 -0.033 0.003 -1.123 
 (0.131) (0.071) (0.064) (0.010) (0.577) 
2009   -0.010 -0.002 0.489 
   (0.059) (0.009) (0.505) 
2010   -0.002 -0.009 -0.385 
   (0.058) (0.008) (0.634) 
2011   -0.010 -0.001 -0.250 
   (0.056) (0.006) (0.561) 
2012   -0.018 -0.002 -0.055 
   (0.052) (0.004) (0.496) 
2013   -0.035 -0.002 -0.841 
   (0.032) (0.002) (0.475) 
Treatment pattern 4: 
recession 
     
2006 0.112 -0.096 0.061 -0.017 0.831 
 (0.131) (0.096) (0.099) (0.025) (0.794) 
2007 -0.097 -0.165 0.089 -0.010 -0.045 
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Treatment pattern 
Anticipation effects Placebo tests 
Total 
innovation 
Human K Sales Age Physical 
Investment 
 (0.139) (0.093) (0.100) (0.018) (0.745) 
2008 0.049 -0.183 0.105 -0.007 0.099 
 (0.139) (0.099) (0.092) (0.015) (0.698) 
2009   0.079 -0.014 -0.583 
   (0.081) (0.013) (0.915) 
2010   0.027 -0.009 0.007 
   (0.072) (0.011) (0.873) 
2011   0.018 0.002 -1.187 
   (0.058) (0.011) (0.740) 
2012   0.011 -0.010 0.086 
   (0.044) (0.007) (0.609) 
2013   0.017 -0.004 0.100 
   (0.024) (0.004) (0.587) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. All 
models include year dummies and controls. Controls include all covariates used in the propensity score estimates. 
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Table S7: Robustness: Definition of the crisis period 
 Ln(Total Innovation 
Investment per worker) 
Human Capital (R&D) 
employees FTE 
 2013 classified 
as recovery 
2013 classified 
as crisis 
2013 classified 
as recovery 
2013 classified 
as crisis 
Treatment pattern 3: recession (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2009 0.120 0.156 0.151*** 0.164*** 
 (0.099) (0.089) (0.047) (0.044) 
2010 0.063 0.073 0.173*** 0.152*** 
 (0.108) (0.100) (0.060) (0.056) 
2011 0.144 0.132 0.143** 0.159*** 
 (0.127) (0.122) (0.057) (0.053) 
2012 0.118 0.155 0.106* 0.109** 
 (0.128) (0.118) (0.056) (0.052) 
2013 -0.002 0.066 0.071 0.115** 
 (0.114) (0.108) (0.055) (0.053) 
2014 -0.182 -0.151 0.035 0.039 
 (0.132) (0.118) (0.057) (0.054) 
Treatment pattern 4: recession     
2009 0.330*** 0.274*** 0.209*** 0.152** 
 (0.117) (0.103) (0.076) (0.073) 
2010 0.363*** 0.267*** 0.341*** 0.286*** 
 (0.121) (0.102) (0.076) (0.065) 
2011 0.325** 0.232* 0.366*** 0.365*** 
 (0.159) (0.126) (0.089) (0.072) 
2012 0.167 0.063 0.191** 0.175** 
 (0.130) (0.119) (0.081) (0.078) 
2013 0.018 -0.015 0.147* 0.164** 
 (0.122) (0.105) (0.087) (0.074) 
2014 -0.021 0.002 0.148* 0.135* 
 (0.120) (0.105) (0.076) (0.075) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the firm level. . *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p 
<0.01. The number of treated firms for spells 3 and 4 is 135 and 77 firms respectively when 2013 is classified as 
crisis period.  
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Figure S1. SMEs. Distribution of the Propensity Score before and after matching 
a) Expansion 
 
b) Recession 
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